H.E. Dr. Marwan Muasher
Ambassador of Jordan to the U.S. & Mexico

New Relationships that are Reshaping the Middle East

AIPAC Policy Conference
May 1998
 

I am glad to have this opportunity to address this conference to outline Jordan's approach to peace in the Middle East and the model of peace that we have adopted and are trying to advance.

Many developments have taken place since Madrid, resulting in the breaking down of many psychological barriers. One should not underestimate this fact because it is the first step towards true dialogue among the people of the area. The fact that the ambassador of Jordan is standing here today, the first Jordanian official to address an AIPAC conference, is an example of the distance we have covered in our attempt to create a new Middle East that is at peace with itself.

I would also like to convey the position of a country which has demonstrated that its commitment to peace has endured and withstood many challenges since the process started in Madrid and particularly since the signing of a treaty of peace between Jordan and Israel. Our treaty of peace with Israel has withstood episodes of tension in the relationship and has survived two different governments and three prime ministers. Jordan is extremely worried today about the negative ramifications of the present crisis that may spill over beyond the Palestinian-Israeli track, thereby affecting the entire region.

When Jordan opted for peace, it did so based on a strategic decision to rid the region of the policies of conflict, and develop a new external environment of cooperation and interdependence with Israel and with all the parties in the region as the only model that would ensure sustainable development. Jordan has sought a full peace with Israel, going beyond the mere signing of agreements between governments to normal interaction among peoples of neighboring countries. Jordan has not only been committed to full implementation of the peace treaty, but to a proactive approach in seeking future areas of cooperation. The framework is a peace treaty full with references to cooperation and mutuality, 15 subagreements covering all areas of cooperation, and a strong commitment to develop the Jordan Rift Valley in a new outlook that sees borders--not as separating edges--but as common interfaces. This qualitative peace provides tremendous opportunities for development for each of the countries involved and for the region as a whole despite the very real risks.

Jordan did so despite the fact that it was undergoing at the time two other reform processes that were challenging and taxing on its population. One is a political reform process which enhances public participation in decision-making at all levels and which consolidates democratic practices. The other is an economic reform program which aims at liberalizing and modernizing the economy, making it more competitive at the regional and international levels and integrating it into the world economy. The decision to pursue peace had to withstand the test of scrutiny by a vibrant, vocal and institutional opposition that was part of parliamentary life and by a press that was well on its way to becoming the freest in the Arab World. The decision for peace was also taken while Jordan was in the midst of a difficult reform process whose aim was to transform the economic structure from one that depended to a large extent on outside factors and resources to one that generated largely internal and self-sustaining activity. That was done despite all what it entailed, with all the ramifications that such a transformation had on the social and economic levels of low-income groups. Naturally, these two processes of change in the political and economic domains had their critics and though they were a minority, they were rather vocal.

While many have argued that a country as small as Jordan should not attempt three reform processes simultaneously, Jordan could not afford to miss the chance for peace, as presented first in Madrid, in Oslo at a later stage, then the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and beyond. It did so fully aware of the risks of moving fast towards achieving a comprehensive peace but equally aware that one has to break away from the fortress mentality, cast away ideological stances, and take risks if that conflict is ever to be resolved. Jordan was not only looking for a decision that would be accepted by the majority of its public but was also equally concerned that that decision be a responsible one for its future generations.

Let me outline the parameters that define Jordan's approach to the peace process and our position on issues that are yet to be addressed and resolved. Despite the fact that we have signed a treaty of peace with Israel, differences in view on several issues do exist between the two of us. It is our hope that such issues can be resolved through working together in the spirit of partnership which is badly needed.

1. Jordan is committed to a full peace with Israel, one that would result in a Middle East characterized by stability and peaceful coexistence which strengthens the forces required not only to sustain such peace, but also to develop it over time, not only by brokering agreements among adversaries, but also by creating a vested interest that would help build and sustain the resulting peace.

2. Jordan is committed to continuously addressing the Israeli public with a clear message of peace, regardless of agreement or differences with the sitting government in Israel. By the same token, this commitment to peace makes it incumbent upon us to speak frankly and candidly when we do have differences with any particular Israeli government, which is what I am doing today.

3. Jordan is committed to strengthening its now institutional relation with mainstream American Jewish organizations and the American Jewish community. Indeed, that dialogue started since the beginning of the peace process. While we might differ on some issues, we do share a common vision of peace. We are very pleased with that dialogue and with the progress we have made towards a long lasting relation. It has helped both of us understand where the other is coming from.

4. The Jordan-Israel treaty of peace offers a potentially ideal example to emulate, if that model succeeds. But it should always be understood that it is not a substitute to reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. Therefore, Jordan's position is that by supporting progress on other tracks, and in particular on the Palestinian-Israeli track, Jordan is supporting its own model and vision for peace, and indeed enhancing the chances of success for its own model. In this regard, the decision by the U.S. Administration and Congress last year to increase aid to Jordan to the level of $225 million annually bodes well not only for the country, but for the whole region as well, because of what it means as support for a model, not simply a country. It comes at time when, despite all our efforts, such assistance is needed in a transition period where political progress in the peace process has been lacking in the region. We are undoubtedly very appreciative of this support and for all what it means.

The message we have continuously tried to send is that if the Jordanian model of peace--which successfully addresses the basic needs of Israelis--fails despite all our efforts, it would be difficult to imagine any other model being put forward, supported and succeeding. Just as we have attempted, successfully, to address the basic needs of Israel and its people, we believe Israel has to do the same for Jordanians and all Arabs so that peace can be supported and maintained at the grass-roots level.

5. It should be clear that Jordan will not be an alternative negotiations partner to the Palestinians, and Jordan's land will not, as George Will and other conservatives would like it to be, serve as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians simply because Jordan is not a transitory state and because the Palestinians want to establish a state on their own soil.

6. Jordan is committed to a comprehensive peace. While the Jordan-Israel treaty of peace is here to stay, and Jordan's commitment to that treaty is ironclad, the ultimate objective of reaping the true benefits of peace, economically and culturally, can only be fully realized by a comprehensive peace that brings economic stability to the region and political solutions that are acceptable to all the parties. These should include meeting the basic needs of the Palestinians, including their right to self-determination and statehood on their own soil. While Jordan's treaty of peace with Israel constitutes an important core of this comprehensive peace, all of the components of such a peace have to be in place if the region is to enjoy stability and prosperity, i.e. a Syrian-Israeli peace, a Lebanese-Israeli peace and a Palestinian-Israeli peace.

7. Jordan is committed to the terms of reference upon which this whole process has been based and the terms of reference which all the parties have agreed to. Foremost among them is UN Security Resolution 242, which has somehow been conveniently dropped or ignored. While the Israeli government today finds it difficult to redeploy from a mere further 4% of the West Bank, we need to remind ourselves that 242 calls for Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in 1967. No interpretation of this resolution, even the unique one by Israel, would come close to Israel retaining more than 60% of the West Bank.

8. Settlements: Jordan's position, and indeed that of the international community, is that the building of settlements is in direct violation of international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention, and contravenes the Palestinian-Israeli agreement which precludes each party from taking unilateral actions that prejudice the outcome of issues to be dealt with in the final status negotiations. Settlement building entails many dangers, foremost among them being the harming of Palestinian rights to land, water, agriculture, and industry, causing a cowding out effect on Jordan by forcing them to migrate. Therefore, we adhere to the sixth principle of Article two of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, which stipulates that the involuntary movement of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either party should not be permitted.

9. Jerusalem: Our position is that the land of Jerusalem occupied in 1967 is Arab land subject to the terms of reference of the Madrid process , based on the land-for-peace formula. With regard to the Holy Places, the rights of all three religions should be respected equally, above the sovereign considerations of any state. Article nine of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty includes a clause that commits Israel to respect the present special role of Jordan in the Holy Shrines in Jerusalem. This clause does not infringe upon the right of Palestinians to establish their own state, with its capital in Jerusalem.

10. Refugees: Jordan is the largest host country for Palestinian refugees, most of whom hold Jordanian citizenship. The Oslo accords led to the postponement of the refugee issue until final status negotiations. For this reason, the article dealing with refugees in the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty stipulates that both signatories work to resolve the issue of refugees in accordance with international law, and relevant international resolutions in an agreed upon bilateral framework, in conjunction with, and at the same time as, the special negotiations on the permanent status of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. Based on that, we will resume multilateral negotiations on refugees in coordination with our Palestinian brethren over the right of refugees. We also acknowledged the wording in the Oslo agreements that the problems of displaced persons should be resolved through a quadripartite Jordanian-Palestinian-Egyptian-Israeli committee.

There is no doubt today that Jordan has serious differences with the present Israeli government. The sense of partnership between the two governments--necessary for breaking new grounds--has lost much of its vigor. The Misha'al affair is only among the most recent of actions by the Israeli government that has contributed to the present state of affairs. Having said that, I stress that peace should not be held hostage to ill-advised actions or short-term difficulties. Clearly, a majority on both sides, indeed a majority in the world, wants peace to prevail in the region.

All of us, thus, share responsibility in making sure this becomes a reality, so that no one party, on either side, can allow extreme ideologies to stand in the process of peace-making and peace-building--a peace that all parties can feel comfortable with, and thus work to protect and preserve.

We applaud the administration's recent efforts to bring new energy to the peace process. These efforts do not impose solutions which no party wants but provide a road map to jump-start negotiations. They help the parties that today are either unwilling or unable to help themselves. Again, we feel that we all share a responsibility to support this effort until it bears fruit.

In this regard, the reluctance, indeed, opposition, of the present Israeli government to the latest U.S. proposals--an opposition based on an unwillingness to cede a further 4% of the West Bank--sends exactly the wrong message not only to the Palestinians, but also to the Arab World. The feeling in the Arab World today is that the Israeli government is not serious about final status negotiations, and will not put forward any serious proposals to cede land and arrive at a credible final settlement, if its present position is any indication.

Having served as Jordan's first ambassador to Israel, I got to witness first-hand the average Israeli citizen's genuine need for security. It is a need that must be addressed in a satisfactory manner. Living in Israel and interacting with the Israeli society, I also sensed a lack of understanding on part of the Israeli citizen of his Arab counterpart's need for security. Collective punishment in the form of closure of the Palestinian areas, demolition of homes and the building of settlements are actions that contribute to the Arab citizen's feeling of the lack of security. Both sides need to realize the importance of security to the other and act accordingly. In this regard, security is not a need over which Israel has exclusivity. We believe that security, narrowly defined in the military sense, rather than security that comes from lasting peace and forging relations of cooperation, is not true nor lasting security. Even if they are narrowly viewed, the US proposals would leave 83% of the West Bank under overall Israeli security control (areas B and C).

His Majesty King Hussein recently sent a letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu urging him to act positively, constructively and urgently in response to the U.S. proposals, in order to save the peace process from an otherwise extremely ominous fate. We hope that Mr. Netanyahu does that, in order to move forward after a very dangerous and long lull, and in order to restore the credibility of the United States and the moderate countries in the region which has suffered largely because of the policies of the present Israeli government.

New relationships that are reshaping the Middle East? Without doubt. The question to pose, however, is reshaping it to what? We have a historic chance to open up and create a Middle East with economic opportunities and peaceful and secure co-existence, or we can stay in our fortresses and by doing so, risk a very dark future. We in Jordan have taken the extra step despite all the risks involved. A bold and wise choice for peace is needed if the future generations in the area are to indeed live in peace.

Thank you. 


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