H.E. Dr. Marwan Muasher
Ambassador of Jordan to the U.S. & Mexico
The Middle East Peace Process: Where Is It Going?
Sons and
Daughters of Lebanon
Norfolk, Virginia
February 20, 2001
It gives me great pleasure to be with you today. Norfolk is like a second home town to me. I have been coming here since 1983 to see my brother Suhail and the many friends my wife and I have cultivated over those years. I am grateful to all those who made this reunion and the opportunity to meet others possible: The sons and daughters of Lebanon, the World Affairs Council of Greater Hampton Roads, Cox Communications and especially Peter Decker and Bassam Qawas who put so much effort in organizing the meeting.
Being among friends, I want to share with you candidly and straightforwardly my thoughts about the present and the future. In regards to the latter, though, I have to make all of you aware of a remark Winston Churchill once made. A diplomat, he said, is someone who can predict what will happen tomorrow, and then, when tomorrow comes, explain why it did not happen.
We are passing through one of the most difficult periods in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ironically, it can also be the beginning of the last chapter in that conflict, with the outlines of a solution now possible despite all the present difficulties and the election of Mr. Sharon in Israel.
This is a situation that begs some questions which have to be asked right at the outset: Where do we stand today? How did we get here? And where is the peace process heading?
If we are to discern the logic behind the Oslo process between the Palestinians and Israel, we can summarize it in one sentence: a series of interim steps and agreements designed to build confidence between the parties while postponing negotiations over the thorny issues (Palestinian state, borders, settlements, Jerusalem and refugees) until the very end. The interim arrangements, with all the painful compromises they entailed, had been accepted by the Palestinians in the hope that the process would lead to negotiating a final-status agreement that is meaningful, credible and secure.
The Oslo process had seen some, in fact many, successes and failures. But it finally led to the Camp David summit last July between Mr. Arafat, Mr. Barak and President Clinton. It was at this point, for the first time since the two sides signed the first Oslo agreement in 1993, that a serious attempt at addressing and resolving final status issues was made. Unfortunately, but understandably perhaps, that attempt did not succeed.
What happened?
The U.S administration initially put the blame squarely on the Palestinians, despite the fact that they had urged Mr. Clinton not to convene the summit without proper preparation in the first place. The "spin" in Washington, then as is now, has been that the Palestinians rejected a very generous offer from Mr. Barak, who had gone farther than any other Israeli Prime Minister did throughout the history of the conflict. Thus, the argument goes, it is Arafat’s indecisiveness, not the content of the proposals, that had prevented an agreement from being reached.
If there is an absolute truth about what happened at Camp David, it has to be seen in a somewhat different light. While it is true that Mr. Barak had gone farther than his predecessors ever did, it is also true that his predecessors never had to negotiate final status issues. As such, they did not have to confront the reality of the need to compromise. It is also true that Mr. Arafat was being asked to practically give up the right of return in exchange for vague sovereignty over only parts of East Jerusalem, which neither he nor any Arab leader could accept without serious repercussions, accusations of betraying the cause and even treason.
But regardless of the outcome, the Camp David summit proved to be very significant. It succeeded in breaking taboos that had been considered unbreakable until then. The idea that one country, Israel, can have the whole of Jerusalem as its own, despite the spiritual, historical and national ties of the Palestinians to the city was abandoned forever. Likewise, the notion of a Palestinian state on most of the West Bank and Gaza was firmly established.
The summit as we all know now could not make much headway over the two fundamental issues of sovereignty over the holy places in Jerusalem and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. But since then the two sides have been able to make significant progress on all issues. The so-called Clinton "parameters", and the subsequent direct negotiations that took place in January between the Palestinians and the Israelis in Taba to clarify and improve on these parameters, brought the sides even closer.
Unfortunately, and despite the fact that the gap has been greatly reduced in many areas, including on Jerusalem, it has not been enough to end the conflict and reach an historic reconciliation.
Let there be no mistake about what had actually happened, though. Despite the fact that the two sides have not signed any binding document, the parameters of a solution are now in place, and are known for all Palestinians, Israelis, and indeed, the rest of the world. From now on, it will be impossible to set the clock back.
This brings us to the most recent development, namely that of the election of Mr. Sharon by a hefty majority in this month’s elections. Several considerations should dictate how the Arab World will deal with the new Prime minister, whose policies and credentials are at best frowned at in the Arab world and elsewhere.
First, while Arabs will give Sharon a short breathing space to form his government and announce his policies towards the peace process, they remain highly skeptical of his willingness to change his hard-line positions or, indeed, attitudes towards Arabs in general. We went through a similar experience in 1996, when Arabs exercised restraint in their reaction to Mr. Netanyahu’s election, only to witness a de facto "freezing" of the process for three years. Sharon’s statements, so far, do not indicate any serious change. His idea of negotiating another long interim arrangement while giving the Palestinians 42% of the West Bank is a non-starter, particularly in light of the understandings I mentioned earlier.
Second, Mr. Sharon (as I earlier pointed out, with conviction, I might add) cannot set the clock back, or claim that because the two sides have not reached a signed agreement, the parameters of such an accord, which have been already set, can be ignored. Doing so will only add to a highly volatile situation, with potentially disastrous results to peacemaking and to the region as a whole.
Third, Mr. Sharon cannot hope to improve relations with Arab countries, including Jordan, in a political vacuum. These relations can only improve in the context of tangible progress on the Palestinian-Israeli front. Substituting meaningful steps to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with rhetoric to improve ties with Jordan, Egypt, Syria or Lebanon will only send a negative signal to Arab governments and peoples alike.
(Which brings me to the all-important question of the role the new administration should be expected to play from now on)
While the United States might prefer to wait until the new Israeli government is formed before it gets re-engaged in the Middle East, it cannot afford to remain on the sidelines. The U.S. has many interests in the region, going beyond those related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this regard, Secretary of State Powell’s recent statements that Washington does intend to remain involved, and that it wants to have a regional approach to the problems of the Middle East, have been welcomed in the Arab World. Americans cannot continue to look at the Middle East merely from the narrow perspective of Israel’s interests. One of the major shortcomings of the last administration’s approach to the conflict was sidelining the advice and experience of the State Department’s experts and relying instead on the ideas and recommendations of a very small office, not to say a single person. Mr. Powell’s intention to take back the peace process file under the umbrella of the State Department’s Near East Bureau will hopefully restore a good balance to the U.S. role. The greatest advantage of this approach is that it would refocus American attention on the region and its problems as a whole, and not just compartmentalize it into Palestine here, Iraq there, and so on.
As part of the new approach, the United States has to take the needs and interests of its Arab allies and partners in the peace process more seriously. Any solution to the conflict has to be based on UN resolutions 242, 338, and regarding Lebanon, 425. It should result, in addition to an accord on the Palestinian-Israeli front, in an agreement with Syria that includes withdrawal of Israel from all the Golan Heights up to the June 4, 1967 border, and a settlement with Lebanon that satisfactorily addresses all its legitimate rights.
It should be noted here that Jordan has a direct interest in negotiations over the problem of refugees. Forty percent of the registered Palestinian refugees, about 4 million, are in Jordan. The majority are Jordanian citizens, and any outcome of Palestinian-Israeli talks on their future has to be acceptable to them. We as a state need to preserve and protect their political and legal rights and ultimately provide them with the choice to return or stay. Rehabilitation cannot take place until and unless the Palestinian refugees feel they have a real choice between returning and/or being compensated. Consequently, and, although the numbers of those returning may be open to negotiations, the principle of the right of return must be upheld. Jordan also insists that we as a country be compensated both for what the state has provided for the refugees over five decades and for costs of integrating those who choose not to go back.
In other countries, such as Lebanon, where Palestinian refugees are not citizens, solutions have to be likewise sought for addressing their problem as well as meeting the legitimate needs of the state itself.
The linkage that currently exists between the peace process and other outstanding issues in the region, particularly Iraq, is clear. The United States cannot afford (nor would it want to) deal simultaneously with two major crises in the Middle East. The sanctions regime against Iraq has only succeeded in increasing the suffering of its people, with no noticeable impact on the policies of the regime in Baghdad. Many countries in the region and beyond are increasingly eroding the sanctions regime. The Administration’s policy on Iraq needs to be revisited in a way that does not keep punishing the Iraqi people, whose social, educational and health standards have suffered tremendously. We suggest that it is very important for the U.S. to conduct such a policy review in coordination with other Arab and Islamic states which share the same objectives.
The recent Islamic summit in Doha has been able to reach consensus with respect to commonly agreed policies and goals:
The need for the Iraqi regime to comply with all UN relevant resolutions;
The need for Baghdad to assure its neighbors that it poses no threat to them;
The need to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq;
These are the elements of a consensus. We hope to be able to do more consultations, while taking them into consideration with our American friends and indeed the world Community ahead of the upcoming Arab summit in Amman in late March.
Allow me to take a couple of minutes to talk about my own country, Jordan.
Jordan has been trying to live up to expectations under very difficult situations. As a very small country with less than five million people, Jordan’s prosperity has always depended on its ability to reach beyond its borders for trade and movement of people. We have strived for peace and stability in the region, and made attaining them a strategic objective. This we have done, not only in order to attract foreign investment, promote trade and tourism in the region and globally but also because we believe the cause of peace is in and of itself noble.
We realized early on that Jordan has to go global to compete in this world, given the small market size and the lack of natural resources. In today’s world, a nation’s ability to survive and thrive is no longer dependent on its size or an abundance of raw materials, but rather on its readiness to use its human talent, interact with the world and be part of the global system. Thus, we have been pursuing an economic reform program for the last ten years that is characterized by an outward (and forward) looking strategy and private sector-led growth. Such a program has witnessed solid accomplishments in such areas as:
--Revamping of all economic laws and liberalizing the trade regime;
--Reducing the budget deficit and increasing exports;
--Privatizing the key telecommunications, energy, railroad and aviation sectors;
--Enacting key intellectual property right laws and placing Jordan at the top of all countries of the region in terms of protection of intellectual property and rights;
--Signing a partnership agreement with the European Union, and more recently, joining the WTO.
These efforts have now been crowned with the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, presently awaiting passage by Congress. This accord will be of tremendous help to Jordan. As only the fourth country in the world to conclude such an agreement with the U.S., Jordan hopes to attract foreign investments to the country, using it as a springboard for producing commodities and services that can enter the U.S. market free of tariffs and quotas. Such investments will create new job opportunities, a key objective of the government, particularly as the unemployment rate in Jordan stands at over 15%. The FTA should also send a strong message of support by the U.S., in addition to an indication of the level of confidence in the degree of liberalization of the Jordanian economy. We hope Congress will be able to ratify the agreement in the near future.
Jordan is also presently pursuing a proactive policy to develop its Information Technology (IT) industry. The country boasts a large number of skilled, yet inexpensive, labor force in this field, a factor we want to use in efforts to develop a vibrant industry. Our attempts at modernization and sustainable development include an overhaul of the educational system, introducing the Internet and computers to all public schools starting from second grade in three years, and the teaching of English in all public schools starting from first grade. In addition, the government is encouraging the establishment of venture capital funds for entrepreneurial projects in the IT field, and is launching an ambitious program to introduce e-government in public services during the next five years.
In short, the Kingdom is doing all it can internally to prepare itself for the future, when it can hopefully reap the full benefits of peace. We will continue to work with our American friends, and with all the parties for a comprehensive peace that will bring not only an end to war but also ensure an era of stability and prosperity for all peoples in the Middle East.
I started my talk by claiming this might be the last chapter in the history of the conflict. I dare give this seemingly naïve prediction because I believe the red lines for all sides have been defined, but also the parameters for a workable solution. There is still important work ahead before we can hammer eventual agreements. However, it is up to all the parties to the conflict to recognize that the end of a long dark tunnel is in sight.
The region has two choices as to which road to take, but only one eventual outcome. Israel can either choose to restart the negotiations where they left off, bridge the remaining gap with the Palestinians, and seal a solution in a timely fashion, or else fool itself that the Palestinians can accept less than what already has been offered and go through a very difficult and unstable period for itself and the region. In the end, Israel will realize that there is no military solution to its conflict with the Arab World. Regardless of the composition of any government in Israel, the fact remains that no amount of force against the Palestinians will bring lasting peace and security. Only a negotiated solution that addresses the needs of both sides will. I only hope that this realization will come before too much time is wasted and too many lives are lost.
Thank you.