Foreign Affairs: The Jordanian Perspective

Jordan's Resource Gap || The Arab Political Order || The Future is in the Balance || The Economic Restructuring Program || Democracy and Human Rights || The Arab-Israeli Peace Process || The Hashemite Vision

As a small state with limited resources, the primary concern of Jordanian policymakers must be to safeguard the country’s immediate national interests. However, the Hashemite leadership has concurrently pursued a number of grand strategic objectives designed to revitalize and reshape the Arab world and the Middle East. Jordan’s geostrategic outlook can therefore best be described as operating on two distinct yet sometimes interacting levels. The first involves activities, behavior and decisions that are related to the immediate welfare and survival of the country. The second track is a long-term activist orientation designed to spur a renewal of Arab energies and promote the overall well-being of the Middle East .

By necessity, actions in the first track, which deal with the day-to-day business of the country, occupy most of the energy and time of the foreign policy apparatus. Actions on the second track, while more domestic in nature, are by no means less vital to the future of the Arab world and the Middle East region in general. Jordan’s location at the heart of Arab Asia, as well as its cultural and historical ties, ensures that it is affected by the overall long-term condition of the Arab world.

One may legitimately question why there is a duality of scope and purpose in Jordan’s dealings with its immediate political environment. Moreover, if such a duality is unavoidable--as has been the case-- then why should the state’s interests ever conflict with the (Arab) nation’s long-term aspirations? The answer to these questions can be found by examining both the existential predicament of Jordan as well as the prevailing status quo forces that dominate politics in the Middle East.

JORDAN’S RESOURCE GAP

Jordan has long suffered from a severe imbalance between resources and population. Before the peace treaty with Israel, Jordan was forced to shoulder the burdens of a front-line state and the resultant military expenditures that the country's legitimate defense requirements entailed. Jordan’s small economic base has also been strained by large waves of Palestinian refugees seeking refuge during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, as well as Jordanians forced to return from the Gulf during the Gulf Crisis.

In terms of national wealth, Jordan has comparatively little in the way of natural resources. Lacking the oil riches of the Arabian Gulf states and facing a serious water shortage, Jordan has built the foundation of its economy on a well-educated and healthy labor force. However, due to the gap between the country’s scant natural resources and the need for economic and social programs to support its burgeoning population, Jordan has been forced to rely heavily on funds from external sources.

Therefore, in order to maintain a reasonable defense capability as well as viable socioeconomic programs, the Jordanian state has relied on the assistance of external powers. Prior to the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91, this help came primarily from oil-rich Arab countries. Western countries, particularly the European Union and Japan, have also contributed much to Jordan’s economic well-being. While the short-term interests of Jordan and such countries (both Arab and non-Arab) have, in the past, converged, partly to maintain a modicum of stability in the region, their long-term interests and strategic outlooks have often been far from identical. This has occasionally been image apparent in the course of interactions over vital regional issues.

The Jordanian leadership is fully cognizant of the interdependent nature of the international arena. However, strong initiatives have been undertaken in recent years to reduce the country’s dependence on external assistance. Grants and loans received now are not financing consumption at the expense of investment--as happened during the boom years of the 1980s. Rather, current assistance is being utilized mostly to facilitate the IMF-designed economic restructuring plan. With the expanded opportunities for trade brought about by an "open" Middle East, a revamped and more competitive Jordanian economy will be better able to stand on its own without depending on foreign donors. This, in turn, will allow more independence for Jordan to further its long-term "second track" strategic objectives toward the revitalization of the Arab world and the Middle East region.

THE ARAB POLITICAL ORDER: CONFEDERAL VS. FEDERAL

Within the regional Arab system, there are two primary strategic outlooks regarding the type of political order that should ultimately prevail in the Arab world. The primary difference between the two orientations concerns how Arab states should relate to one another.

The idea of unity is a powerful and emotive political imperative within the Arab world, as Arabs share a common language, culture and much of the same historical background. In respect to the promotion of Arab unity, Jordan represents what can be termed the "federal" school of thought, long espoused by the Hashemites. The main viewpoint of this school is that the Arab counties, especially in Asia, should organize politically along federal lines. While virtually all Arab countries have employed the slogans of Arab unity for domestic consumption, and some have attempted a revolutionary approach, Hashemite Jordan has pursued a course based on realism. History has shown that the outbidding and unrest fostered by "revolutionary " regimes has done far more to set back the cause of Arab unity than to promote it. Jordan and other members of the "federal" school have pursued a moderate approach aimed at creating and strengthening true bonds of cooperation between Arab states.

The Hashemite commitment to Arab unity has been demonstrated repeatedly. Sheriff Hussein led the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire after having been promised a unified state for the Arabs. After the conclusion of World War I, however, separatist forces and local Arab chieftains colluded with Britain and France to impose the confederal state system against the will of the majority of the Arab populace. The confederal scheme was later institutionalized in 1945 by the adoption of the Charter of the League of Arab States, and it remains in effect today.

The Hashemite quest to unify the Arabs into a cohesive state nonetheless continued. King Abdullah, the founder of the modern state of Jordan and the grandfather of the current monarch, King Hussein, repeatedly tried to unite Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon into a single entity. At times he also included Iraq in these unity plans. However, supporters of the confederal scheme, as well as the primary regional power, Britain, thwarted all of King Abdullah’s initiatives for unity except one--in Palestine. After a military and political struggle to defend as much of mandatory Palestine as possible from the Zionist forces, King Abdullah managed to united Jordan and the West Bank in 1950. The unification of Jordan and the West Bank was achieved politically and voluntarily, and assisted in defending the West Bank from Israeli expansion for 17 years. After Israel occupied the West Bank (and the Gaza strip) in June 1967, the federation arrangement continued for another 21 years. It was formally dissolved only on July 31, 1988, when Jordan severed its legal and administrative links with the occupied West Bank. Although the West Bank-Jordan federation was in many ways a successful and viable experiment, Jordan has acknowledged the strength of Palestinian desires for an independent state. It considers the Palestine Liberation Organization the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and refuses any attempt to negotiate on their behalf.

Countering the advocates of a viable Arab federation have been the supporters of the "confederal" school of thought. While this school has often employed the rhetoric of Arab unity, the policies of its members have often served to further divide the Arabs. The "unity" of the confederal school has usually meant domination of one state by another,. while the federal approach advocates genuine cooperation between equal states. Since the confederal framework has historically been the prevailing one, its supporters see themselves as status quo powers. Concomitantly , they oppose any party that would challenge this status quo. Of course, Jordan does not pose a military challenge to the status quo, but the confederal school has historically been wary of the long-term political and ideological challenge posed by the Hashemite leadership.

In addition to differing over the desired type of relations between Arab states, Jordan has posed a challenge to the status quo in two other vital areas. As opposed to the binding ideological rigidity of some Arab states, Jordan has long interacted positively with global powers in an independent fashion of how the state should interact with citizens. Jordan enjoys the most liberal human rights record in the Middle East, and is on the road to a thriving pluralistic democracy. However, because these policies are a threat to the status quo they have not been applauded by most of Jordan’s Arab neighbors.

THE FUTURE IS IN THE BALANCE

The question of the duality of Jordan’s external policies can now be understood more clearly. Jordan’s leadership of the "federal" school of Arab unity, its positive interaction with global powers and its progressive record on human rights and democratic participation have been perceived as a potential threat to powers favoring the status quo in the Arab world. However, to survive and further immediate state interests, Jordan must continue to seek support from these states. This duality has led to an unresolveable tension in Jordan’s foreign policy between the requirements of ‘day-to-day" state business on the one hand and the long-term strategic objective of rejuvenating the Arab world on the other. Jordan’s regional behavior can therefore be characterized as a balancing act between short-term interests and long-term goals.

THE ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM

In relation to the country’s regional relations, Jordan’s three primary policy goals embody a mixture of both short-term and long-term interests. Since 1989, massive efforts have been underway to restructure and revitalize Jordan’s economy. Foreign policy in relation to this program has been largely designed to attract assistance in the form of grants and loans, debt cancellation or rescheduling, as well as technical know-how, in order to better achieve the adjustment goals. Also relevant to foreign policy in this regard are agreements concerning the opening of export markets and steps to attract private sector investments. All of these are examples of the country seeking to maximize its interests by pursuing external actions that promote economic growth.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

At the other end of the spectrum is Jordan’s promotion of democratic government and human rights. Although no one can claim that Jordan is yet a full democracy--if, in fact, any "full democracies" exist anywhere--the country’s success in its democratic path has encouraged the leadership to present Jordan as a model for other states in the region to emulate. King Hussein has made clear his belief that non-democratic Arab regimes should gradually democratize themselves from within, or most probably they will be changed by popular pressures and demands for democracy. Jordan certainly looks for the spread of democracy throughout the Arab world, viewing this as a desirable objective in the long-term interests of Jordan and all Arabs. It therefore presents its own experiment as a model for others with similar inclinations to follow. However, Jordan does not deliberately export its democratic ideology to other Arab countries.

The democratization of Jordan is an excellent example of the country going against status quo forces in the Arab world in the interests of Arab rejuvenation in the long term. However, Jordan’s approach is different from that of some other Arab leaders who, in trying to overcome the status quo, have used violence and/or promoted insurrections in the hope of instigating revolutions. Jordan, by contrast, is leading by offering the example of orderly change and constructive engagement.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

Jordan’s third primary policy track concerns the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the Kingdom has long favored a peaceful solution to the problem-in fact, King Hussein was one of the original authors of UN Resolution 242, which first spelled out the formula of "land for peace"-the origins of the current process date from the Madrid Conference of 1991. While the economic restructuring program is clearly designed to maximize tangible economic benefits for the country, and democratization in the long-term strategic interests of Jordan and the region, the peace process holds a mixture of economic and political benefits that are visible in the short term, as well as strategic dividends which will only come to fruition with time.

The stability achieved by peace has brought increased investment as well as a boom in the tourism sector. Jordan has also benefited in an even clearer way, as its treaty with Israel guaranteed its rightful water share and returned its occupied lands. By ensuring the security of its western border, Jordan has also been able to reduce the size of its armed forces and rechannel this money into programs to strengthen the social safety net, thus easing its economic restructuring program. The interaction between the peace process and the restructuring program was also reinforced when a number of states agreed to write off or reschedule Jordan’s debt repayments after it signed a peace treaty with Israel. The massive debt, which amounted to 200 percent of the GDP in 1988, and reached a high of US$ 8.9 billion at the end of 1990, threatened the success of the economic adjustment program. The centerpiece of the country’s debt reduction program was the write-off by the United States of approximately US$ 700 million in 1995. Jordan’s debt now amounts to 92 percent of its GDP, a high but manageable level which the country hopes to reduce further.

While the treaty of peace with Israel has brought the aforementioned immediate benefits, Jordan is actively promoting an overall peace settlement which will free the peoples of the region from the burdens of war and give them the opportunities necessary to build a better future. Much of the vast wealth that is currently spent on arms can be redirected to promote development. A healthy regional peace also promises to spur political participation and a greater appreciation of human rights, as the absence of an Israeli military threat will make justifying authoritarian police states and large armies more difficult.

A comprehensive and just peace will also allow the states of the Middle East to cooperate in confronting what may be the greatest regional challenge, the lack of water. In the sphere of economics, regional peace will help to boost investment, and greater trust and openness between states should allow for freer trade and more joint economic programs. Indeed, the world is moving towards free trade and Jordan’s restructuring program is designed to take advantage of the country’s geographic location by strengthening its export potential. Although Jordan seeks to expand trade to areas outside the Middle East-namely the Far East, Europe and the United States-comprehensive peace is essential to its efforts to substantially increase its exports within the region.

Peace is thus bringing about immediate and tangible dividends in the short term, while removing obstacles and "ploughing the field" for future regional development. Jordan’s support for the peace process is thus a mixture of the two tracks of its foreign policy-maximizing the immediate interests of the state and promoting the long-term rejuvenation of the Arab world and the Middle East. In assuming a position of leadership in the peace process, King Hussein is once again challenging the status quo.

THE HASHEMITE VISION

Like most states, the majority of Jordan’s day-to-day foreign policy centers on the business of protecting the country’s immediate interests and promoting the short-term welfare of its citizens. However, the Hashemite leadership has also pursued another track designed to promote the long-term rejuvenation of the Arab world. Jordan’s vision of the desired Arab order can be distilled from the speeches, remarks and statements of both King Hussein and Crown Prince El Hassan. They call for an Arab world which guarantees democracy, human rights and political participation; social justice in dealing with the wide gap between the haves and have-nots; recognition that Arab security is indivisible; relations between Arab countries based on cooperation and respect, not dominance; and, the resolution of territorial disputes between Arab states. Essential to the Jordanian vision is the importance of being open-minded to the outside world and remaining aware of the constraints imposed by the current international order.

The promotion of these long-term objectives has sometimes conflicted with Jordan’s pursuit of its immediate interests. As a small state with very limited resources and a growing population, Jordan must safeguard its interests by maintaining good relations with neighboring countries as well as global powers. Jordan is seeking in the long term to change the status quo in the Arab world, and has at times encountered resistance and suspicion from the dominant status quo states. Jordan must thus play a balancing act between the two tracks of its foreign policy, safeguarding the immediate interests of its citizens while promoting the rebirth of the Arab world and the well-being of the region.

Source: Jordan Diary 1997, International Press Office, The Royal Hashemite Court, Amman - Jordan

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