October 27, 2004

Jordan Times

The Lessons of a Decade of Cold Peace

Rami G. Khouri

Ten years ago this week, Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty that has survived the test of time and brought some meaningful benefits to both countries; yet, its weaknesses also offer important lessons and insights into Arab-Israeli relations, and what is required for a comprehensive peace between Israel and all its neighbours. On a visit to Jordan earlier this month, I was reminded again that vast segments of the Jordanian population are uncomfortable with the peace treaty. Antagonism to Israel is frequently expressed in those ways that are available to Jordanians to express themselves. In the mass media, occasional peaceful public demonstrations, and public opinion polls, Jordanians strongly criticise Israel for how it treats the Palestinians.

Here is probably the single most important lesson for any Arab country that is exploring making peace with Israel: Arab populations tend to judge Israel on the basis of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. Regardless of whether this is useful, fair or reasonable, the fact remains that Palestine is the lens through which Arabs see and deal with Israel. This, in turn, reflects two factors that resonate deeply throughout the Arab world, and have done so for over half a century now.

First, Israel's occupation, subjugation, ethnic cleansing and forced exile of Palestinians represent a political and psychological wound that is felt in most Arab societies to some degree, along with the direct and indirect costs of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict to other Arab societies. Second, Arabs widely associate Israeli behaviour with American policies and aims in the Middle East. People throughout this region routinely criticise the United States' actions in Iraq in the same breath in which they criticise Israeli policies in Palestine. In both cases, ordinary Arabs feel that Israel's harsh treatment of the Palestinians — whether killing young boys and girls, uprooting thousands of olive trees, assassinating hundreds of local leaders, or building colonial settlements on vast tracts of confiscated Arab land — is a humiliation of all Arab societies that identify with the Palestinians.

In this context, for an Arab country to make peace with an Israeli state that continues to kill, colonise and terrorise Palestinians is seen as deeply shameful, highlighting one's weakness in the face of Israeli and American dictates. Many Jordanians feel uncomfortable, even ashamed, of having an Israeli embassy in their capital city while Israel persists in its assault against Palestinian people, land and society.

Another problem is that many Jordanians feel that they were forced into making peace against their will, reflecting a very bitter sense of triple helplessness: the average Jordanian feels that he or she has no real say in how national policies are made, in the face of the three overriding political desires of the Jordanian, Israeli and American governments. Not surprisingly, this is a key criticism of the populist Islamist political movement in Jordan that accuses the Jordanian government of being undemocratic and of being subservient to Israeli and American goals.

Seen from the perspective of the Jordanian man and woman in the street, therefore, the peace treaty with Israel highlights a combination of negative, even shameful, realities of one's weaknesses, vulnerability and subservience to the overwhelming power of others. Many Jordanians and other Arabs see this as a degrading process that only accentuates their total helplessness, and the only way they can respond for the moment is to criticise Israel, the US, and the peace treaty with Israel.

Jordanians also complain that they have not felt the benefits of the peace treaty, which is a rather unfair criticism. In fact, the Jordanian society has benefited handsomely from the impact of the 1994 peace treaty, in the form of billions of dollars of American aid and a US free trade agreement, crucial additional water supplies from Israel, tens of thousands of new job opportunities through the Qualified Industrial Zones linked to the Israeli and American economies, and a sense of comfort that Israeli official policy no longer sees Jordan as a neighbour of convenience that can be eliminated in order to make room for a Palestinian state. The peace agreement is one reason why Jordan has registered solid economic growth in recent years, and its tangible economic and other benefits should not be minimised due to the anger that defines its political reception in the country.

Nevertheless, this only emphasises the point that ordinary Arabs will remain blind even to positive realities of life when it comes to dealing with Israel (and the United States in this case), and they will judge events almost totally through the prism of the Palestine issue. This is why His Majesty King Abdullah, feeling the anger against Israel among his people, recalled Jordan's ambassador to Israel in 1990 and has not yet sent him back.

What can we conclude from the past ten years of Jordanian-Israeli peace? Mainly that governments have the power to conclude formal agreements, but only the citizens of a country have the capacity to put life and warmth into any such accords. One of the weaknesses of the Jordan-Israel peace accord was the obvious lack of popular consultation on the matter, with an unrepresentative Jordanian Parliament rubber-stamping the agreement in the face of obvious and widespread scepticism among the citizenry. A more profound democratic consultative process within Jordan probably would have delayed the agreement for a time, but in the end would have led to a peace treaty that enjoyed more popular support.

It is also clear, in retrospect, that a majority of Jordanians wants a permanent peace agreement with Israel and does not wish to remain in a perpetual state of war or tension. The same is true today in all Arab countries, whose leaderships would do well to learn the lessons of the Jordanian and Egyptian experiences of their peace accords with Israel. Peace agreements can be signed by Arab governments very easily, regardless of the will or sentiments of their people; but genuine, lasting peace requires a process of people-to-people reconciliation that, in turn, must be based on resolving the root issues that divide them, starting with the Palestine issue. This has not happened among Arabs and Israelis, which is why the Jordanian and Egyptian peace treaties with Israel remain cold and sadly unfulfilled.