HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

FINAL DRAFT
NATIONAL RESILIENCE PLAN
2014-2016
PROPOSED PRIORITY RESPONSES TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS ON JORDAN AND JORDANIAN HOST COMMUNITIES
29May 2014
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<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFEX</td>
<td>Arab Future Energy Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWC</td>
<td>Aqaba Water Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Compact Fluorescent Lamp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Service Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Concentrated Solar Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUMERC</td>
<td>Columbia University for Social Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERFKE</td>
<td>Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSR</td>
<td>Emergency Services and Social Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPD</td>
<td>Family Protection Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Society for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Health Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCP</td>
<td>Host Communities Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCSP</td>
<td>Host Community Support Platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIES</td>
<td>Household Income and Expenditure Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMIS</td>
<td>Health Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRH</td>
<td>Human Resources for Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUDC</td>
<td>Housing and Urban Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCS</td>
<td>Islamic Charity Center Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHAS</td>
<td>Jordan Health Aid Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHCO</td>
<td>Jordan Hashemite Charity Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPD</td>
<td>Juvenile Probation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPFHS</td>
<td>Jordan Population and Family Health Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRF</td>
<td>Jordan River Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWU</td>
<td>Jordanian Women's Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>Local Development Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOEd</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2
MOMA  Ministry of Municipal Affairs
MOPIC  Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation
MOSD  Ministry of Social Development
MW  Mega Watt
MWI  Ministry of Water and Irrigation
NAF  National Aid Fund
NAR  Needs Assessment Review
NEEAP  National Energy Efficiency Plan
NFE  Non-Formal Education
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NHF  Noor Al Hussein Foundation
NNGO  National Non-Governmental Organisation
NRP  National Resilience Plan
NRW  Non-Revenue Water
PHC  Primary Health Centres
QLI  Quality of Life Index
RLDP  Regional and Local Development Programme
RRP  Regional Response Plan
SCADA  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SDC  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SGBV  Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SWM  Solid Waste Management
TAD  Transboundary Animal Diseases
TB  Tuberculosis
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNHABITAT  United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOPS  United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA  United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
UNWOMEN  United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
US  United States
WAJ  Water Authority of Jordan
WASH  Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB  World Bank
WWTP  Waste Water Treatment Plants
YWC  Yarmouk Water Company
ZENID  Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for Development
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This National Resilience Plan (NRP) provides a three year programme of high priority investments by the Government of Jordan (GOJ) in response to the impact of the Syrian crisis on the Kingdom of Jordan.

Now into its fourth year, the crisis in Syria continues to adversely impact Jordan in a variety of ways. The NRP represents an attempt by the GOJ to take initial stock of its consequences in the primary sectors, locations and communities most affected. In doing so the GOJ has reached out to its national, regional and international partners for assistance, both in its preparation, as well as for its financing and implementation. The NRP will help mitigate the potentially destabilizing political, demographic, social, economic, and fiscal effects of the crisis.


Critical investments are needed in Education US$538.5 million; Energy US$117.7 million; Health US$468.9 million; Housing US$5.3 million; Livelihoods & Employment US$136.6 million; Municipal Services (including Solid Waste Management) US$205.9 million; Social Protection US$341.9 million, and; Water & Sanitation US$670.8 million. In addition to these investments supplementary budget support totaling US$758 million, US$965.4 million, and US$187.5 million is sought to compensate for additional subsidies, security costs as well as transport and aviation income losses borne by the government as a direct result of the Syrian crisis. The complete budget breakdown of annual sector requirements is illustrated in Table 1 below.
Table 1: NRP Overview of Investments, all sectors, 2014 – 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
<th>% of total budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>157,230,000</td>
<td>175,050,000</td>
<td>206,200,000</td>
<td>538,480,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>35,800,000</td>
<td>45,290,000</td>
<td>36,600,000</td>
<td>117,690,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>138,623,600</td>
<td>177,834,000</td>
<td>152,469,000</td>
<td>468,926,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>1,042,000</td>
<td>2,632,000</td>
<td>1,582,000</td>
<td>5,256,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods &amp; Employment</td>
<td>43,477,500</td>
<td>49,775,000</td>
<td>43,350,000</td>
<td>136,602,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Services</td>
<td>79,112,157</td>
<td>72,761,888</td>
<td>53,979,721</td>
<td>205,853,766</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection &amp; Social Protection</td>
<td>111,854,711</td>
<td>116,073,211</td>
<td>113,933,211</td>
<td>341,861,133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>137,550,000</td>
<td>344,998,000</td>
<td>188,240,000</td>
<td>670,788,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total: NRP Programmatic Response</td>
<td>704,689,968</td>
<td>984,414,099</td>
<td>796,353,932</td>
<td>2,485,457,999</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total: Subsidies for Syrian Refugees</td>
<td>208,000,000</td>
<td>250,000,000</td>
<td>300,000,000</td>
<td>758,000,000</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total: Security Support</td>
<td>291,650,000</td>
<td>320,815,000</td>
<td>352,896,500</td>
<td>965,361,500</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total: Aviation and Transport Support</td>
<td>62,500,000</td>
<td>62,500,000</td>
<td>62,500,000</td>
<td>187,500,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1,266,839,968</td>
<td>1,617,729,099</td>
<td>1,511,750,432</td>
<td>4,396,319,499</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) has provided the leadership for the overall crisis response. It established the Host Community Support Platform (HCSP) in September 2013 - a strategic consultative body comprised of government line ministries, donors, UN agencies and INGOs to ensure coordination and provide advice to the Jordanian Government’s response to the crisis. In consultation with donors, MOPIC also created five task forces and later three additional reference groups in the highest priority sectors, each led by a government ministry and supported by donors, UN agencies, and international/national NGOs. Hence, the two stage process through which the NRP has been
prepared was conducted within a highly participatory and extremely constructive environment:

1. A Needs Assessment Review (NAR) was undertaken in October and November 2013. The NAR was validated in a workshop with all partners on 28 November 2013. The NAR provides the core baseline of needs for the NRP.

2. The NRP preparatory process commenced immediately upon conclusion of the NAR. The five task forces and three reference groups each developed strategies to respond to the crisis. All major stakeholders were engaged in a collaborative process which sought to tap the knowledge and expertise of all partners. Attention was purposely placed on the identification of concrete priority responses to address the critical needs into which additional funds could be channeled quickly and effectively.

As a result, the projects included in the NRP are only those that can be realistically implemented by the end of 2016. A full listing of projects proposed for detailed development, financing and implementation to deliver the results sought by the NRP (see table 2 below) can be found as Annex 1. The main geographic target for assistance of the NRP are the governorates of Irbid, Mafraq, Amman and Zarqa in which the majority of the Syrian refugee population is hosted, with special attention placed on supporting vulnerable groups within these communities.

Projects proposed within the NRP have been designed through a resilience-based development approach. Emphasis has been placed on projects that help households, communities and institutions to ‘cope’ and ‘recover’ before attention turns towards ‘sustaining’ the effects of the project over the longer-term. The majority of projects proposed within the NRP fulfill that requirement. A large number build on existing programmes where implementation capacity is present or can quickly be ramped-up to accelerate delivery.

The figures in Table 1 above represent the sum total of additional financing that is sought from the international community for the implementation of the NRP for 2014 - 2016. It is a statement of the gap in funds needed to ensure a realistic, proportionate and deliverable response to the crisis in the affected areas of Jordan and through which the NRP results set out in Table 2 below will be attained. The HCSP led by MOPIC and supported by donors, UN agencies, and national and international NGOs will continue to provide oversight of the progress of the NRP through its implementation via the work of the task force and reference groups, supported by the HCSP Secretariat. A Results Monitoring Framework at the project level has been developed (see Annex 2) to support the assessment and reporting of progress.

Donors wishing to make a financial contribution to any of the priority projects of the NRP are invited to make direct contact with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The GOJ encourages donors to make use of national treasury systems by providing direct budget or programme support. Alternatively donors can select the most appropriate financial and implementation modality, such as via line ministries, UN agencies, the World Bank, NGOs (national or international), or other entities including the private sector, subject to their comparative advantage/proven expertise in the particular sector and their adherence to the principles of transparency, accountability and aid effectiveness.
In undertaking the NRP efforts have also begun to incorporate existing/ongoing donor financed programmes within the scope of the NRP where it can be argued that these projects also contribute to mitigating the impact of the crisis on Jordanian host communities and where they are relevant to the sector specific objectives of the plan. Donor projects per sector that were completed, ongoing or pipelined at the time of NRP formulation are attached as Annex 3. Further work is required between the Secretariat and donors to complete and align this mapping to the priorities of the NRP.

The NRP has also been developed alongside the humanitarian support package of the Regional Response Plan (RRP6). Through the NRP process the HCSP Secretariat has facilitated a multi-disciplinary team of focal points drawn from UN agencies appointed to each sector to ensure that overlap and duplication with the RRP was minimized. In the relatively few number of projects where overlap previously existed at the draft NRP stage, these projects have now been reconciled one way or the other at the NRP Finalization Dead Sea Retreat organized by MOPIC on 9-10 March 2014. Where projects still appear in both plans they appeal for differentiated aspects of same intervention.

The underlying principle is that the NRP is oriented towards bridging the gap between immediate and more sustained assistance provided to Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities most affected by the crisis, whereas the RRP focuses primarily on emergency support for Syrian refugees. MOPIC, technical ministries, donors, UN agencies, NGOs and the HCSP Secretariat will continue to work closely together through the detailed project design, implementation, monitoring and reporting phases of the NRP to ensure coherence at all levels between humanitarian and development oriented projects. This will lay the foundations for a comprehensive response framework, plan, and process to be initiated by MOPIC in consultation with all partners.
**Table 2: NRP Results Framework 2014-2016**

**NRP Overall Aim:** To successfully mitigate the effects of the Syria Crisis on Jordan and Jordanian Host Communities (US$ **2,485,457,999**)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Overall Objectives</th>
<th>Sector Specific Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td><strong>Energy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to quality inclusive education – particularly for children – through formal and informal opportunities. (US$ 117,690,000)</td>
<td>To address the increased demands for energy arising as a result of the arrival of the Syrian refugee population through innovative and sustainable solutions. (US$ 117,690,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | **Sector Specific Objectives** |
| | 1Rapid sustainable energy solutions to offset incremental energy demand (short-term). (US$ 51,090,000) |
| | 2 Solar energy solutions for growing energy supply needs (medium-term). (US$ 66,600,000) |
| | 3 Increasing the absorptive capacity of MoH facilities in areas with a high concentration of Syrians. (US$ 20,900,000) |
| | 1Urgent financial support to MOH budget provided to cover the cost of health service delivery incurred as a result of Syrian crisis. (US$ 418,000,000) |
| | 2 Ensuring that human resources gaps in medical specialties are filled in areas most affected by the crisis (US$ 23,040,000) |
| | 2 Housing-related regulations and policies help meet the needs of refugees and all Jordanian vulnerable groups (US$ 7,314,000) |
To maintain acceptable functioning level of critical medical equipment, ambulances and vehicles in MoH hospitals and health centres (US$ 4,060,600)

5 Strengthening MoH non-communicable disease control to cover the sudden increase of population incurred by the Syrian refugee influx (US$ 2,926,000)

Table 2: NRP Results Framework 2014-2016

NRP Overall Aim: To successfully mitigate the effects of the Syria Crisis on Jordan and Jordanian Host Communities (US$ 2,485,457,999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Overall Objectives</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>livelihoods</strong></td>
<td>Municipal Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jordanian local governance system is responsive to host citizens and communities' needs identified in governorates most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. (US$ 205,853,766)</td>
<td>1 Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis. (US$ 179,507,000)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1 Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis. (US$ 179,507,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local economies of the areas through support to new micro and small vulnerable households (young men and women).</td>
<td>2 Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees. (US$ 14,502,766)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And preserve pastoral land and natural for Jordanian host US$ 19,002,500)</td>
<td>3 Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long term as a result of better performance in core functions and more enabling legal and fiscal framework. (US$ 11,844,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 10,600,000)</td>
<td>4 Expanding and improving services. (US$ 395,430,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE NRP

The overall aim and purpose of the NRP is:

“To successfully mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan and Jordanian host communities”.

Five task forces and three reference groups have been at the forefront of efforts to bring forward a priority programme of projects to accomplish this overall aim. Each sector has set out a sector wide goal, with a number of sector specific objectives. Below each sector specific objective a number of priority projects have been proposed. Collectively these comprise the NRP.

The main sector objectives of the NRP are as follows. They seek to address the primary needs identified in the NAR, a summary of which can be found in section 1.2 below:

In the education sector the main aim is:

“To provide access to quality inclusive education for all children (Syrian and Jordanian) – particularly the most vulnerable – through formal, non-formal and informal opportunities.”

The energy sector will attempt:

“To address the increased demands for energy arising as a result of the arrival of the Syrian refugee population through innovative and sustainable solutions.”

In the health sector efforts will be targeted:

“To improve the health of citizens residing in the areas most affected by the Syrian crisis.”

Regarding housing:

“Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have improved access to affordable and adequate housing within a housing sector that helps meet the housing needs of all Jordanians.”

In the livelihoods sector the thrust of the programme is directed towards achieving the following objective:
“The capacity of poor and vulnerable households in host communities is strengthened to cope with and recover in a sustainable way from the impact of the Syrian crisis, and mitigate future effects on their employment and livelihoods.”

In respect to municipal services:

“The Jordanian local governance system is responsive to host citizens and communities needs identified in governorates most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis.”

Within the area of social protection:

“Vulnerable groups affected by the crisis have access to improved social protection and improved legal and operational protection frameworks and services in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis.”

Implementation of the water & sanitation projects of the NRP will:

“Enhance the capacity of the GOJ and the host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water & Sanitation services.”

Cross cutting issues of gender equality, social cohesion, environmental sustainability and private sector have been integrated within the programmes of the sectors outlined above and targets, indicators and baselines for them feature in the NRP Results Monitoring Framework (Annex 2).

Aid Coordination Objective

An additional Government objective of the NRP is to strengthen aid coordination and effectiveness mechanisms between the government and its main international partners grappling with the multi-faceted challenges and consequences associated with the Syrian crisis. By establishing the HCSP as a high level coordination group of primary stakeholders and constituting a series of task forces and reference groups as sector working groups - each with donor, UN agency, and NGO membership – and by undertaking the NAR through an inclusive process and initiating a participatory process for the development of the NRP, the Government has started to demonstrate its commitment towards some of the key recommendations that had been made in the aid coordination report of February 2013.1

An attempt has most definitely been made to reach out to international partners within the donor, UN, and NGO communities as the Government seeks to comprehensively mitigate the consequences of the crisis in the governorates and in the Kingdom. At the operational level MOPIC and a number of lead line ministries have sought to develop stronger technical and programmatic partnerships through the course of NRP formulation. The Government aspires

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for this partnership to strengthen over time through the financing, implementation, monitoring and reporting phases of the NRP.

Additional collaboration between donors is an option that could be considered to give consideration to a more coordinated donor response to the NRP.

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS ON JORDAN

Now into its fourth year the Syrian crisis continues unabated. It comprises many dimensions that span the political, security, economic, and social landscape, demanding an unprecedented level of international cooperation, both regionally and globally, to be able to respond to its complexity. Those countries most severely impacted by its spillover are those directly bordering Syria.

Jordan has shared significantly in bearing the brunt of the crisis and in shouldering its burden on behalf of the international community. From a humanitarian perspective, and in recognition of the human tragedy unfolding within Syria, the Government has maintained an open border policy to Syrians seeking refuge, protection, and safety from the conflict. Within that same humanitarian spirit the government and the people of Jordan have extended public services, facilities, resources and hospitality in an attempt to accommodate the most pressing needs of the Syrian refugee population now in its midst.

A massive influx of over 585 thousand registered refugees\(^2\) has so far occurred, over 50 percent of which are children. Approximately 80 percent of all refugees are hosted within Jordanian communities and the remaining 20 percent are accommodated within camp settings. The sheer volume of numbers has placed a critical pressure on social, economic, institutional and natural resources systems ability to cope. Jordanians residing within these locations have been impacted to different degrees by the process. Their livelihoods, opportunities, and rightful access to quality public services have been detrimentally affected, in particular with regard to the most vulnerable segments of the population, an important portion of whom are present in the governorates that are host to the highest numbers of Syrian refugees, namely Irbid, Mafraaq, Amman, and Zarqa.

Despite hosting the Syrian refugees, Jordanians have also found themselves confronted with additional competition from Syrians in local job markets, with a worrisome increase in child labour. This has put downward pressure on local wages and caused food, fuel, rent and in some cases, water price inflation. In some areas rents alone are reported to have increased by up to 300 percent. This has placed a squeeze on household budgets and living standards. Vulnerabilities among Jordanians are beginning to reappear in households that had not long since escaped poverty. In those areas most affected by the refugee influx all population segments are affected in some manner. But as in all crises, it is the poorest and most

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\(^2\)UNHCR 11 March, 2014
vulnerable Jordanian households, and the most vulnerable people within them, that are impacted the most.

The government has granted access to local public goods and services to Syrian refugees. This encompasses schooling, health care, municipal and social services, food and fuel/electricity subsidies, as well as water supply and sanitation. At the same time, this has placed an additional strain on local services and infrastructure, some of which were previously deficient in quality, or inadequate in capacity, to meet the needs of the local pre-crisis population.

As the crisis continues unabated it is likely to produce further flows of refugees. Host communities, institutions, systems, infrastructure, and services will soon reach their absorption capacities. In some localities, these thresholds have been stretched to breaking, whilst in others they have already been exceeded. In municipal services for example, in particular solid waste management, the system is unable to keep pace with the increased demands placed upon it.

Absorbing such a vast number of Syrians within what was already one of the poorer parts of the country is thereby having a profound impact on the demographic and socio-economic landscape of Jordan. Tensions in some areas have become palpable. These can be expected to build as long as the crisis endures. Urgent action is needed to address these challenges and to prevent the prospect of an inter-generational reproduction of the crisis, which is an increasing risk the longer the crisis continues. Whilst the impact of the crisis appears to be predominately urban in nature, rural livelihood systems have also begun to suffer. Public health concerns raise the alert of the possible spread of animal and crop trans-boundary diseases and pests resulting from the collapse of Syrian veterinary and phytosanitary services.

The crisis and its regional ramifications have also cast a shadow over the performance of the Jordanian economy and the health of public finances. At the macro, or national level, Jordan’s public and private sectors have been significantly impacted by the crisis by virtue of the integrated nature of regional trade, markets and cross-border transit routes, which have been severely disrupted. GDP growth has been directly affected by the crisis, reportedly by about 2 percent in 2013\(^1\), depressing it downwards to 2.7 percent in 2012 from an average of 6.6 percent in the 2000 – 2008 period.\(^4\) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has dropped off and is at its lowest for five years. In the past three years the trade deficit widened from JD6 billion in 2010 to JD9 billion in 2012.\(^5\) The annual budget deficit rose from US$1.05 billion in 2010 to US$1.8 billion in 2012 and public debt has now risen beyond the 60 percent stipulated in the Public Debt Law as the debt to GDP ratio; increasing from 61.1 percent in 2010 to 75.5 percent in 2013. Furthermore 14 percent of the population is below the poverty line, 57 percent of which are children, a reality that does not augur well for the future.

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\(^3\) Annual Report, Central Bank of Jordan, 2012
Faced with a straightened economic outlook and with limited fiscal space in which to manoeuvre, between 2009 – 2012 the Government resolved to reallocate funds from its capital investment programmes to its operating budget to enable it cope with the sudden effects of the crisis. This included transfers for energy and food subsidies to Syrian refugees, and increased financing to offset additional demands for services in respect to education, health, water supply, wastewater and solid waste management. The direct cost of extending these public services to Syrian refugees within Jordanian host communities continues to accumulate. Yet these additional measures still fall considerably short of the level and quality of services that are required to meet all of the basic needs, especially for the poorest and most vulnerable groups (children, women, youth etc.) in the most affected governorates. In addition, a number of social challenges such as domestic violence, violence in schools, child labour and early marriages are reported to be exacerbated by the current situation. This adds a further strain upon the Jordanian social protection services.

The Government has also been mindful to protect its previously hard-won human development accomplishments, such as in some of the MDGs over the past decade (i.e. infant and maternal mortality). Given the extent of the impact of the crisis at the structural, governorate and host community levels, there is now a considerable risk that if critical investments in the priority interventions set out within this three year national resilience plan are not forthcoming, Jordan’s human development trajectory could be jeopardized.

Given all of these factors, the Syrian crisis and impact present very real fiscal ramifications for the country. Since there is no prospect of an immediate solution to the crisis or swift return of Syrian refugees to their homeland in the near future, it is important to stress that the Government’s fiscal and administrative capacity is limited. A comprehensive response that supports the host community phenomenon and which underpins the human development pathway of the nation thereby requires significant and sustained financial support from the international community. This is essential to help shore up Jordan’s development gains, reinforce core public services, support trade and transport, and compensate for the benefits of security, as well as the welfare subsidies provided to the Syrian refugees.

Through this NRP, and more broadly through its diplomatic and political outreach, the GOJ is hereby appealing to the international community at this particular juncture to increase the levels and accelerate the rates of aid to assist it address the multifaceted challenges set out above. Assistance should be channeled primarily to its national and local institutions, as well as through UN and NGO development partners. This will serve to complement the generous humanitarian support being provided. It will also enable the GOJ to take greater responsibility for the planning, implementation and management of response interventions being designed for its own host communities as well as in support of the Syrian refugee populations. The overall approach aims to strengthen resilience within institutions, systems and communities. This includes the combination of ‘coping’, ‘recovering’ and ‘sustaining’ elements of programmes contained within this government led NRP, since the response is geared to address what is, in all likelihood, going to evolve into a protracted medium to longer-term crisis.
1.3 NRP FORMULATION PROCESS

Main Stages in the Development of the Plan

The NRP has emerged through two distinct phases:


The HCSP has exercised oversight and provided co-ordination for the direction of the process through its meetings on 10 September 2013, 28 November 2013, 9 January 2014 and 2014. The work of the NAR and NRP has largely been operationalized through the work of the task forces and reference groups within which ministries, donors, UN agencies, and international/national NGOs have all collaborated. The NAR laid the foundations necessary for ensuring an evidence-based planning exercise.

The Needs Assessment Review

In October 2013 the HCSP, led by MOPIC, and represented by donors, the UN, national and international NGOs decided to jointly undertake the NAR. This involved all of the major agencies engaged in the implementation of humanitarian and development programmes, in particular those with a focus on the most-affected host communities, in sharing and distilling key findings from a considerable reservoir of independent research and analysis that had hitherto been undertaken on either a geographic or sectoral basis. The work culminated in the production of a detailed NAR report which was subsequently validated at a workshop hosted by the Secretary General of MOPIC on 19 November 2013. The validation workshop was attended by around 80 participants representing donors, line ministries, UN agencies, and national and international NGOs. The NAR was then formally launched as a document at the second meeting of the HCSP chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation on 28 November 2013.

Completion of the NAR generated a knowledge bank of critical data, pooled in one place, which for the first time since the crisis had begun helped to generate an overall picture of the most critical tangible, and some of the more subtle effects of the Syrian crisis on Jordanian host communities and central services. The full NAR report can be found at www.hcspjordan.org. A concise summary of some of the key NAR findings is outlined in Section 1.2 above ‘Overview of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan’.

The NRP Preparation Process

The full and final Report into the Needs Assessment Review (NAR) can be found at www.hcspjordan.org
The second distinct phase set about developing the NRP. This was inaugurated by MOPIC at the same HCSP meeting on 28 November 2013 as the immediate successor step to the production of the NAR. Guidance was issued from the HCSP Secretariat to all line ministries and UN technical support agencies to the five task forces and reference groups outlining:

1. ‘The Purpose and Parameters of the NRP’ – a short three page briefing note outlining the government’s rationale for undertaking the NRP at that time;

2. The ‘Timeline’ for the initial NRP formulation and consultation process - commencing 30 November 2013

3. A ‘Sector Strategy Template’ to ensure consistency of approach was followed across all sectors, circulated, and subsequently completed through a series of task force and reference group consultations to which all members contributed;

4. Guidance was distributed on ‘prioritization criteria’ for the selection of response options that could be rapidly developed into concrete project proposals. This was provided to the task forces based on:
   i. Evidence of a clearly identified need/vulnerability/geographic focus;
   ii. Priority endorsement from national or local authorities;
   iii. Ability to deliver quickly and locally upon existing institutional arrangements, etc.
   The prioritization criteria were subsequently distilled and reiterated within the Project Summary Sheets (see Annexe 1 attached).

5. Critical consultation points were included in the timetable. This complemented the participatory process that engaged line ministries, donors, UN agencies, international and national NGOs in the work of the task forces/reference groups in helping craft the sector strategies. For example:
   i. A donor and INGO consultation meeting took place on 10 December 2013 on the overall NRP aims and preparation process at the UN Office in Amman.
   ii. A meeting for Heads of UN agencies based in Amman followed on 17 December 2013 chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator.

6. At the Draft NRP stage each sector strategy was subject to an independent cross-check of preliminary costing at the specific intervention level.

7. The first complete ‘Consultation Draft’ of the NRP was issued to all partners for comment on 23 December 2013.
8. MOPIC hosted a review workshop on 5 January 2014 to incorporate donor, INGO and UN agencies comments on the Consultation Draft of the NRP.

9. The Draft NRP was issued to the members of the HCSP ahead of its meeting on 9 January 2014.

10. The Minister for Planning and International Cooperation presented the Draft NRP at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria at a special side event entitled ‘How neighbouring countries are responding to the Syria crisis: resilience, stabilization, and solidarity’ on 15 January 2014;

11. A further workshop was hosted at MOPIC for all task force representatives on 9 February 2014 to discuss the template for the completion of the Project Summary Sheets intended to supersede the interventions sheets prepared at the previous stage.

12. On 9-10 March MOPIC organised the ‘NRP Finalization Workshop’ (Dead Sea Retreat) in order to:
   a. Review and finalize the Project Summary Sheets;
   b. Review and discuss NRP management, Results Monitoring Framework and proposed financing modalities;
   c. Ensure greater practical measures were taken to mainstream gender within the NRP;
   d. Resolve any remaining areas of NRP overlap with the RRP on a project by project basis between UNHCR and each of the task force/reference groups;
   e. Finalize the NRP narrative text.

The Dead Sea Retreat also resolved to:

1. Complete the Results Monitoring Framework at project level for the NRP based on the completion of the Project Summary Sheet targets and indicators. See Annex 2.

2. Progress the donor mapping exercise of all existing and ongoing donor programmes that have clear relevance to the NRP. Provisional information relating to this mapping is attached to the NRP as Annex 3.
Throughout the formulation process the five government-led task forces and three ‘reference groups’ (see Management section 3.1 below), met on numerous occasions for the drafting of the sector strategies, response options and project summary sheets until consensus was reached that each reflected the best and most effective programme that could be advanced to successfully mitigate the effects of the Syrian crisis on Jordanian host communities over the three year period.

1.4 ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPINNING NRP SUCCESS

Like all forward oriented plans, the NRP is predicated upon, and susceptible to, certain assumptions and risks. The main assumptions that MOPIC identified as it embarked on the successive assessment and planning processes leading up to presentation of the NRP were considered as follows:

1. An Enabling Environment Fostered by Government:

The GOJ recognized at the outset that for a significant political, programmatic, technical and financial partnership to be galvanized between it and the international community that could marshal sufficient resources commensurate with the scale of the challenges facing it, a new strategic framework would need to be brought into being. To satisfy such an objective and to seek to develop a befitting nationally led response to the Syria crisis, the GOJ elected to do its best to create a more open, engaging and enabling working environment with its key partners. This represented a bold and innovate decision by MOPIC that had a degree of risk attached to it. The decision was based on the assumption that MOPIC and lead line ministries involved in the NAR/NRP process would all be able to sustain their commitment to greatly enhanced levels of participatory assessment, planning, financing, implementation and monitoring for the advancement of a National Resilience Plan. It also meant implementing a number of the recommendations that had been previously promoted by donors in the ‘Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan’ report of February 2013, referenced in section 1.1 above.

To create such an enabling environment entailed a government commitment to fostering a participatory approach across all the ministries involved. It meant reaching out to partners at different levels and sustaining this through a number of stages. The chief mechanism through which the enabling environment would be demonstrated and upheld at the political and financial level was the HCSP. Meanwhile, the task forces, led by lead line ministries also attempted to adopt the same commitment to openness and engagement, and thereafter drove a participatory process at the technical and programmatic level. A further, so far untested assumption related to the enabling environment refers to the six financial mechanisms that have been opened up by the GOJ to make donor support to NRP implementation as versatile as possible. This can be found outlined at section 1.6 below.

Without the GOJ being able to establish and sustain such an enabling environment with its key partners, the inspiration behind the NAR and NRP risked being short-lived. Through the
enriched consultative process which has characterized the plan’s development between November 2013 and April 2014, the GOJ has sought to demonstrate a sincere and genuine commitment to creating and sustaining an enabling environment for the NRP.

2. Guaranteeing Donor Support

A second major assumption made by the government upon commencement of the NAR/NRP process was that it would be able to depend on a high level of support from the international community in helping it arrive at a proportionate response to the crisis. The GOJ is well aware that its international partners were keenly involved in seeking a solution to all aspects of the Syria crisis and has no reason not to expect the practical involvement of donors in collaborating fully to help Jordan devise a priority response plan to it. The GOJ also anticipated that the scale of the refugee flows and the gravity of needs would mean that donors would be more compelled to assist the government in a number of ways:

- At the political level, the GOJ established the HCSP, and invited donor countries to engage in its membership, as a visioning and oversight body to help assist the GOJ design a befitting response to the crisis.

- At the technical and programmatic level it was also assumed that donors would be willing to engage in more detailed operational contributions, based on their working knowledge of the sectors and programmes in which they were already technically engaged.

- More fundamentally, the GOJ has assumed that donors would be willing and able to channel increased levels of financing to Jordan in light of the fiscal burden and impact of the crisis in the Kingdom. MOPIC duly made its presentation of the draft NRP at a special side event at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria held in Kuwait on 15 January 2014 on this premise. Pledging and resource-mobilization events over the plan period will be held through which it assumes that funds will be forthcoming to assist in implementation of the plan.

- It was also assumed that for donors to enhance their levels of development cooperation to Jordan in light of the crisis, a well-conceived, systematically prepared and robust national plan of resilience, founded upon the accumulation of well researched and articulated needs, would be required.

- Likewise, it has been assumed that the NRP, serving as a bridge between short-term humanitarian assistance and the longer term development planning horizon, would be an appropriate vehicle to which donors could subscribe in order to help navigate the transition from emergency, through recovery, to longer term sustainability and resilience. Further details on the links between the humanitarian and development oriented programmes is set out in section 1.3 below.

3. Harmonization, Alignment and Integration with Ongoing Initiatives

In creating a new coordinating mechanism and new working arrangements for the preparation and management of the NRP the GOJ was acutely aware of the potential for duplication with
two existing programme streams. The first in respect to humanitarian projects contained within the RRP(6). The second concerning existing/ongoing programmes of development cooperation, that may, to a greater or lesser extent, already be helping to mitigate the effects of the crisis on Jordanian host communities.

The assumption has been made that even where overlaps did occur that very quickly these could be harmonized and resolved through co-operation and collaboration with all concerned partners. Chiefly with UNHCR in the first instance, and subsequently with UN agencies and development partners in the second. Indeed, as the NRP took shape through the consultative work of the task forces, facilitated by UN agencies, and with donor and NGO partners present, it was also assumed that the prospect of overlaps would be minimized. Where overlaps did occur, on a project by project basis these could be discussed and agreed between UNHCR, the HCSP Secretariat, and MOPIC.

Regarding the achievement of a closer alignment between the existing/ongoing programmes of development cooperation between donors and government it was anticipated that a mapping exercise could be initiated to find an entry point through which to begin to incorporate these into the framework of the NRP, aligned to its priority programmes. That work was begun in November 2013 and information so far gleaned from the donors is attached as Annex 3. Information presented in Annex 3 will require a further iteration to fully establish linkages with the NRP sector specific goals.

Looking ahead, MOPIC will strive to bring greater integration and coherence between the RRP and NRP structures, systems, and plans. Since December 2013 it has been looking into the feasibility of creating a comprehensive response plan and framework for the planning exercise for 2015. This will entail ongoing discussions with donors, UN agencies, and NGO partners. Further details concerning the direction of the NRP and the enhanced leadership role of the GOJ in the coordination of both humanitarian and resilience-based development planning under one comprehensive framework is outlined in section 1.3 below.

4. The Syrian Crisis is a Protracted Crisis.

Prior to initiating the creation of the HCSP, NAR and NRP, a key assumption made by the GOJ as the crisis deepened and approached its fourth year without any cessation of the civil conflict appearing likely, was that it had evolved into a protracted and longer lasting tragedy for all concerned. Its deepening implications for Jordan, month on month, year on year, finally prompted the GOJ to outline its three stage approach to mitigating the impact of the crisis on Jordanian host communities and on the burgeoning pressures being placed on local front line government services.

As a result, (i) the HCSP was convened, (ii) the NAR launched and (iii) the NRP formulated to generate forward momentum for a considered medium-term response plan seeking to fill the gap and bridge the transition between the emergency assistance carried out by the humanitarian providers on the one hand, and the longer-term development plan, implemented chiefly by development partners and the GOJ on the other. The NRP was assumed to be an interim delivery vehicle through which the GOJ would be able to address a mounting range of diverse challenges, chiefly through accelerated project implementation, to which the
protracted nature of the crisis had given rise. Hence, the parameters of the NRP were anticipated to be set as a plan of approximately three years’ duration with a strong geographic focus. It was envisioned to be expressed as a well-coordinated portfolio of priority projects to meet the short to medium-term needs in critical sectors, with additional targeting intended to focus on the most vulnerable within those communities.

As a plan of ‘resilience’ it was also assumed that investments made would not only contribute towards assisting Syrian refugees and Jordanians cope with the effects of the crisis. But that it would also assist in the strengthening of Jordanian authorities, in particular local institutions, systems, and communities build further resilience to endure the longer term implications of the crisis. The medium-term nature of the crisis now appears to be the most likely scenario that is unfolding, therefore, the development of the NRP over recent months appears to be a wholly prudent and appropriate undertaking for the Government and its partners to have pursued at this juncture.

1.5 INCREASING ALIGNMENT - HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AND THE RESILIENCE-BASED DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE

In light of the assumption outlined above, the NRP has been designed to complement, rather than compete with, existing and planned humanitarian programmes. The GOJ is grateful to the humanitarian agencies and to a generous international donor community for supporting the plight of Syrian refugees, both within camps and in the efforts that have been made to extend some of that support to the Jordanian host communities.

It is widely acknowledged across all parties responding to the crisis that the current levels of financing and modus operandi of humanitarian aid are unsustainable in their present form. An array of critical issues, including those of political, macro-economic, social cohesion and stability, alongside the stress placed on national and local institutions and budgets to sustain a decent service to the combined refugee and hosting populations, all stretch beyond the mandate and reach of conventional humanitarian agencies.

A comprehensive strategy that brings humanitarian and development programming under a common resilience-based framework is required, integrating the strongest elements of both perspectives, as complementary features of the same desire to ensure a human rights based approach, the preservation of human dignity, the extension of protection measures and equality of access assured to all to the full spectrum of basic services.

Moving forward, the NRP represents an important strategic part of that framework. As a focused three year endeavour it is intended to link to the immediate measures contained in the Regional Response Plan 6 (RRP6) provided by humanitarian agencies. It has been designed to complement and underpin humanitarian efforts by promoting a medium-term, development-oriented approach. Particular efforts have been made by both MOPIC’s Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit, the HCSP Secretariat and UNHCR to iron out
duplication at the project level between the two plans. That collaboration will be ongoing and will inform the subsequent revision of the RRP and the ultimate design detail of projects put forward for financing under the NRP.

More generally, projects prioritized for inclusion in the NRP may entail building on, extending or expanding existing/ongoing programmes and activities, whether these be government, donor, UN, or NGO implemented initiatives, or a combination of agencies dependent on the particular arrangements that prove to work most effectively in each sector or geographic area. Where possible the NRP proposes to utilize partnership vehicles and operating structures that are already in place, or innovate new initiatives specifically tailored to the crisis. The objective is to ‘fast-track’ the delivery of priority projects that have been identified in each sector. The full list of projects so far prioritized by the task forces and reference groups is attached as Annex 1.

The NRP therefore establishes the entry point for the resilience-based framework to be applied alongside and in coordination with the humanitarian track. The two tracks will continue to operate in a complementary fashion as they are gradually brought together under one roof and under one integrated framework. The Dead Sea Retreat Workshop organized to finalize the NRP on 9-10 March attended by 80 participants representing the task forces and reference groups, ministries, donors, UN agencies and NGOs, provided a good opportunity for UNHCR to consult each task force/reference group and agree which project should be retained under the NRP and RRP respectively.

Building on from this collaboration, the next step is to work incrementally towards the harmonization and alignment of these two programme streams. In the meantime both the humanitarian and development programmes will need to continue to forge ahead with their separate structures, programmes and delivery mechanisms with the minimum of overlap, especially on the ground.

Projects selected and prioritized within the scope of the NRP have pursued a ‘resilience’ approach. That is, they have been broadly designed to enable households, communities, services and institutions initially to ‘cope’, gradually to ‘recover’, and, ultimately to strengthen and ‘sustain’ their capacities, thereby deepening their resilience to future shocks. Among other virtues of following this approach it may also serve to prevent the inter-generational reproduction of the effects of the crisis.

The strength of the approach is that at the household, community, local and national institutional level the NRP aims to:

1. Achieve high impact rapid results in the short-term by injecting additional direct support to reinforce local coping mechanisms, by providing urgently needed equipment, tools, medicines, cash transfers, staffing etc.

2. Provide a subsequent boost to augment local services for infrastructure repair, extension, upgrading or enlargement of facilities, including the renewal, rehabilitation, restoration and recovery of infrastructure, capacities and services,
including a continuation of beefed-up initial capabilities with skills training and service development allied to the aims of the programme.

3. Lay foundations for the longer term strengthening of local institutions, capacity development, partnerships, and participatory working for the sustained effective and efficient delivery of services. The latter might align with previous or on-going programmes of reform, such as decentralization etc. This also entails support to national government budget/institutions (subsidy, security and transport) and partners to enable contingency and crisis planning and mitigation in the future. Strengthened systems and capacities in critical areas reinforce its own resilience over time.

4. Fully incorporate and focus attention on a vital range of cross-cutting issues essential to human wellbeing and development. This incorporates gender equality, social cohesion and environmental sustainability. It also ensures an approach that increasingly targets social and economic assistance to vulnerable groups, women, youth and children through all of the main public programmes and services - health, education, water and sanitation, livelihoods and social protection etc.

1.6 THE NRP CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING NATIONAL PLANS

The primary Jordanian national plans and strategies are the National Agenda (2006 – 2015) and the Executive Program (2011 – 2013). The GOJ has also submitted a number of projects in the value of US$413.7 million for financing within the RRP6. As a result, those projects listed in the RRP6 for 2014 have not been included within the NRP.

The Executive Program of the Government complements the National Agenda by providing a series of clearly delineated development streams. Those most relevant for the purposes of the NRP are:

1. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);
2. Poverty alleviation and local development;

Five out of the seven programmes contained within the current Executive Programme also find strong expression within the NRP. Those sectors are:

1. Social welfare (including healthcare, poverty, social development and local development);
2. Employment and training;
3. Education;
4. Infrastructure (including housing, water and sanitation, and energy);
5. Public finance, including fiscal stability.

Whilst the programme outlined in the NRP is national in its design, its focus is directed specifically towards mitigating the Syria crisis, whose impact is most sorely felt in the northern governorates, and on the local host communities and public services within those locations.

Jordan’s Executive Program aims at:

“-stimulating economic growth, increasing the welfare of Jordanians by reducing poverty and creating jobs through sustained and broadly shared growth, while achieving fiscal sustainability and external balance through boosting investments and enhancing exports, as well as lowering inflation, budget deficit, and public debt, in addition to developing water resources and alternative energy resources, and developing human resources.”

Contrary to the above set of aspirations the negative consequences of the crisis are having the reverse effects. Economic growth is dwindling, the welfare of Jordanians is beginning to suffer, especially those most vulnerable inhabiting the affected host communities. Vulnerability within those communities is predictably reported to be on the increase. Studies at the household level soon to be undertaken will reveal more about the extent. Economic and fiscal conditions are also pressing and local public services, such as those mentioned, including key municipal services, are under considerable pressure. Hence the global economic crisis, which had already brought a downturn in the overall fortunes for the Kingdom have been compounded by the Syrian crisis across all of these fronts.

Though certainly not a panacea, the NRP is aligned with the GOJ’s main over-arching National Agenda and Executive Program as outlined above. Moreover, the NRP provides an important vehicle for highlighting the most immediate challenges of the crisis and adding fresh impetus to the practical implementation of existing sector-based master plans where they can be accelerated in a highly targeted manner.

1.7 CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

Four cross cutting issues have been identified within the design of the NRP. These relate to gender equality, social cohesion, environmental sustainability and private sector. The cross cutting issues feature as an integral part of the Project Summary Sheets (Annexe 1) and Results Monitoring Framework (Annex 2).

Gender Equality
The gender dimensions of the impact of the Syria crisis on Jordanian host communities is so far only partially understood, both in the NAR and in the NRP. Further research is required as the crisis continues and as the response to it materializes. The Social Protection, Education and Health sector strategies are more advanced in giving attention to the importance of gender equality within their analysis and proposed response interventions. The Employment and Livelihoods, and Water and Sanitation sectors also make good reference to considerations of gender equality in their initial designs. Of the four cross-cutting issues, Gender features more prominently across all sectors within the Results Monitoring Framework.

Social Cohesion

Issues of social cohesion will gain in ascendency as the protracted and escalating nature of the crisis becomes more apparent with the passage of time. All NRP sectors have been tasked to give consideration to how their response interventions mitigate the prospect of increased tensions between Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts. From a conflict-sensitive perspective, the design, implementation and management of interventions can constructively build trust and understanding between communities. If treated insensitively however, projects can inadvertently fuel agitation between communities and refugees. The two sectors of the NRP have so far assumed to jointly lead on social cohesion are that of Local Governance/Municipal Services and Social Protection, both of which outline strong content in this regard. The Housing sector also has a dedicated section on social cohesion within its responses. Within Municipal Services, a clear undertaking to civic and community participation emerging within that programme provides an important basis for ensuring that the design of interventions pays regard to issues of social cohesion in urban settings. Beyond those two sectors, Employment and Livelihoods, Education and aspects of the Water & Sanitation programme have given indications that they are alive to the issues of social contest, social justice and social cohesion.

Environmental Sustainability

Five sectors have made a very clear and conspicuous commitment to ensuring a premium is placed on environmental sustainability. These are Employment and Livelihoods, Local Governance/Municipal Services, Water & Sanitation, Energy and Housing. Employment and Livelihoods have dedicated sections of their programming oriented towards the preservation of precious, fragile, and finite natural resources, principally from a rural perspective. Municipal Services and components of the Housing response meanwhile are chiefly concerned with ensuring that appropriate controls are maintained over the planning, construction, and the quality of the built environment and urban public spaces. The energy sector proposes innovations in renewables and energy saving measures that would propel the Government toward meeting the additional energy demands placed on the country as a direct result of the Syrian crisis. In these respects also it is acutely aware of Jordan’s overall environmental vulnerability and the risks presented by climate change.

Private Sector
Whilst there are opportunities for the private sector to play a role within the social sectors of health, education and social protection, the five sectors that have more conspicuously embraced the private sector as a capable partner for progressing the aims of the NRP are housing, energy, municipal services, livelihoods and water and sanitation.

Within housing, a model of leveraging private sector finance for construction and mortgages to benefit lower-income households through engaging the banking sector is innovative. The housing reference group also recognises the multiplier effect of the construction sector as a driver of economic and social development, chiefly drawing upon the enterprise of the private sector to meet housing and local infrastructure needs. The energy sector is also at the forefront of leveraging technological innovation within the private sector, by incentivizing private households to make positive choices concerning the conservation of energy consumption in the light of environmental sustainability and Jordan’s hard pressed energy constraints. Within the municipal services and water and sanitation sectors, public-private partnerships, or direct contracting to private sector operators hold the prospect of yielding greater efficiencies and securing higher delivery standards to targeted households and communities within the scope of the NRP. Local economic profiles and development plans are proposed in the main governorates affected by the crisis. The livelihoods sector is virtually wholly dedicated to unleashing micro enterprise, promoting SMEs, providing training and job creation, offering business opportunities through targeted value chain analysis, generating recommendations to address the mismatch in the labour market etc. The early lessons learned from engaging the private sector in the work of the NRP should be quickly harnessed.

1.8 MANAGEMENT

NRP Operating Structure

The HCSP was established on 10 September 2013 to serve as a strategic partnership and coordination mechanism for the GOJ. Chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation it consists of senior representatives from line ministries, UN agencies, donors and NGOs. The HCSP provides overall direction, coordination and coherence to all partners working to mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordanian host communities. The work of the HCSP is supported by a small Secretariat which provides administrative, technical and facilitation support to the Platform and its task forces/reference groups.

To operationalize its work, five task forces with formal terms of reference have been established by the HCSP:

1. Employment, Livelihoods & Poverty;
2. Education;
3. Health;
4. Municipal Services;

Additional ad-hoc ‘reference groups’ have since been formed in relation to:

6. Social Protection;
7. Housing;

Each task force is led by the responsible line ministry, with key support provided by MOPIC. Donors, UN agencies, national and international NGOs are integral to task force membership and functioning. The task forces were created to lead the NAR and take responsibility for generating priority response interventions within their sector for inclusion in the NRP. As a result task forces and reference groups have exercised a vital role. Firstly, in exchanging and pooling data for the creation of the NAR. Secondly, they were the engine rooms for consultation and crafting of the sector strategies and the identification of priority projects – the main body of the NRP. Thereby, all members of the task forces/reference groups have played an important role in arriving at decisions on the priority projects to the particular aspect of the crisis that their sector is charged with seeking to address. Current membership of the task forces is set out in Table 10 below:

**Table 3 Task Force Membership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Line Ministry</th>
<th>UN Agency</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>INGO</th>
<th>National NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>UNICEF &amp; UNESCO</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Questscope</td>
<td>JRF &amp; Save the Children JO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
<td>JHAS &amp; Save the Children JO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods and Employment</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>JHCO &amp; ZENID/JOHUD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Services</td>
<td>Ministry of Municipal Affairs &amp; Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>JWU &amp; NHF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Irrigation</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, the membership of the three ‘Reference Groups’ is as follows:

- **Social Protection**: Led by the Ministry of Social Development, supported by UNICEF and UNWOMEN.
- **Energy**: Led by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, supported by UNDP and UNOPS.
- **Housing**: Led by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, in collaboration with the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), supported by UNHABITAT and UNOPS and involving a wide range of government, private sector and NGO stakeholders.

Whilst ownership of the content of each Sector Strategy resides with the government, each task force/reference group has shared in the responsibility for its production among its members, often working in sub-committees or teams, generating options and arriving at overall consensus on its priorities. A collaborative, collegial effort characterized the process, which was an innovative one for the government. Designed as a strategic and technical partnership, the HCSP and the task force structure will continue to provide the overall guidance and consultative space for monitoring the implementation of the NRP.

The HCSP will continue to meet regularly to receive reports of progress, identify bottlenecks, and consult and agree on remedies. A further development of the capacity of the Secretariat will include building on the functionality of the existing HCSP database hosted at www.hcspjordan.org as an integrated development results, project tracking and aid co-ordination system linked to NRP implementation. This will contribute to improved data, reporting, mutual accountability and aid effectiveness.

As outlined in section 1.3 above, the HCSP will seek to achieve greater coherence between humanitarian support measures that impinge on Jordan that focus primarily on the Syrian refugees and the NRP programmes. It will strive to put in place an integrated humanitarian and development framework to respond to the overall impact of the Syrian crisis in Jordan, with the support of the respective UN agencies, donors and international/national NGOs. This will eventually enable a more complete oversight of all humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan in respect to the crisis, whether the assistance is targeted towards the Syrian refugees or Jordanian host communities, or both.

Ultimately to ensure its success the NRP needs to be financed. Without funds being made available from the international community, the NRP will be unable to deliver on the priority interventions contained in this document. Under such a scenario the host communities would remain denied the support that is critically needed. To neglect them at this point in time, as evidence of the impact of the crisis which they have shouldered to date is clearly documented, would be unconscionable.

Hence, the scope of its formulation and the timing of the release of the NRP is entirely appropriate. Donors wishing to make a financial contribution to any of the priority
The GOJ also acknowledges that in some cases alternative financial and implementation modalities can also be instrumental in delivering the desired results and outcomes of the NRP. For this reason the HCSP and task forces have been established, so that partner organisations such as UN agencies, the World Bank, donors, and NGOs (national or international), can consult with the lead line ministries on all aspects of the NRP including the important work associated with its financing and practical implementation.

1.9 IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Clear implementation, monitoring, reporting and accountability arrangements are fundamental to the success of the NRP.

Implementation Arrangements & Financing Modalities

As an underlying principle, the GOJ wishes to continue to maximize the degree of collaboration that has so far characterized the approach in both the NAR and NRP preparation. It has every desire to seek to maintain the enabling environment that it has sought to foster as outlined in section 1.2 above. Bearing this in mind the government is aware that projects can be delivered through a variety of ways and means in order to hasten the delivery effects felt by local communities. It thereby outlines below the six main implementation and financial modalities through which it encourages donors to channel its development co-operation in support of the needs and priorities contained within the NRP:

1. **Direct Budget Support** – The GOJ encourages donors to place funds at its general disposal to support the mounting fiscal deficit incurred as a direct result of the Syria crisis. The government has quantified the projected cost of extending its subsidy support to the Syrian refugee populations residing in host communities through providing subsidies in terms of water, flour, LPG, electricity, transport and security related services to be US$ 758 million in the period 2014 - 2016.

2. **Budget Support for Specific Projects** – The GOJ has set up a guaranteed channel through which donors can provide ear-marked financing to a particular government project in any of the priority investment areas contained in the NRP. Funds should flow to the single treasury account through the Ministry of Finance or a special account in the name of MOPIC in the Central Bank of Jordan, which will then ensure that those funds flow swiftly to the specified ministry for the project intended. A
reporting system will be established to ensure that donors receive regular progress reports and financial expenditures.

3. **UN agencies** – UN agencies will continue to be accepted as important financing and implementing partners to the Government of Jordan in seeking to help mitigate the impact of the crisis on Jordan. UN agencies have been especially active in providing critical humanitarian interventions through the RRP. Similarly, UN agencies have played an invaluable facilitation and advisory role in the NAR and NRP formulation process. The government would like to maintain the engagement of the UN in providing technical assistance, co-ordination support, policy advice, support for service delivery as well as taking on implementation responsibilities for component parts of the NRP in areas in which they possess a distinct and unrivalled comparative advantage. Government looks to the task forces, chaired by respective lead line ministries and supported by donors to best propose the exact implementation arrangements and responsibilities to be assumed by UN agencies in each case.

4. **Trust Fund and Multi-Lateral Financing** – The GOJ keeps an open mind as to the utilization of Trust Fund mechanisms to support the financing of the NRP. The government encourages donors to make use of the existing World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Municipal Services. Consideration will be given to the establishment of similar multi-donor trust funds for other sectors or one general trust fund for the NRP after close coordination with the GOJ.

5. **International/National NGO** – Funds flowing to international and national NGOs for their implementation of priority NRP programmes is an acceptable mechanism that the government is pleased to see continue in cooperation with the GOJ. NGOs possess a variety of talents and specialties, often with trusted linkages with local communities permitting them to reach vulnerable population segments with their highly targeted programmes. The merits of the involvement of NGOs as implementing partners will be considered on a case by case basis. Approval of projects by NGOs (national or international) must be endorsed by the relevant task force Chair, MOPIC and be in accordance with the Prime Minister’s Office as per the relevant NGO law.

6. **Other development partners** – This concerns foundations, academic institutions, private sector organizations, etc. The same guidance applies to this category of development partner as that of NGOs above. Basically, the government welcomes a diversity of partners that can help it to deliver on its NRP commitments, providing the engagement of these agencies are selected on the basis of their clear comparative advantage, areas of expertise and in accordance with established government operating principles and laws.

**Project Financing and Approval Process**

The process for financing and approving NRP project will be as follows:
1. Donors wishing to express a pledge or financial commitment should make direct contact with MOPIC. The donor pledge or financial commitment may be an un-earmarked contribution or earmarked for one or several sectors or projects. In addition, the donor may express a preference with regard to the six main implementation and financing modalities presented above, and a specific implementing agency. Implementing agencies may include a Government or public institution, a UN agency, a non-governmental organization, or the other development partners specified in point 6 above.

2. The donor and MOPIC will jointly agree on the above and will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to this effect. The MoU will also be signed by the implementing agency(ies), if one has been selected at this stage. The decision will be based on a review of priority areas for support, whether sectoral, geographical or project-specific, and on the implementation and financing modalities and the implementing agency’s comparative advantages.

3. Based on the above, a comprehensive project document will be elaborated by the implementing agency for the project to be financed. The project document shall abide to the requirements that will be set by the HCSP Secretariat. The Secretariat may be requested to support public institutions in the drafting of project documents.

4. The project document will be submitted to HRCU/Secretariat for review prior to submission to the Inter-Ministerial Committee chaired by MOPIC for approval. The project document may also be sent to the relevant task force(s) for comments.

**Results Monitoring Framework**

Within the NRP a hierarchy of outcomes, or results, have been established to ensure interventions across the NRP are directed and corralled towards achieving their ultimate purpose (see Table 2 in the Executive Summary above for the complete illustrative overview of the hierarchy of outcomes at the Overall Sector and Sector Specific levels, and Annex 2 in respect of the Results Monitoring Framework for Project level outputs, targets and indicators). Within the four levels of objectives outlined below responsibilities are to be undertaken between the government and its international and national development partners working in close collaboration. Government remains at all times in the driving seat of the NRP process, with international and national partners requested to play an important role in assisting NRP implementation.

To monitor the progress of NRP implementation a Results Monitoring Framework has been devised at the project level (see Annex 2). It follows a standard results hierarchy presented in the form of a logical framework at the project output level. Monitoring will be an ongoing
responsibility within the task forces and reference groups. Each detailed project document will contain a description of how each project is intended to be monitored. Quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports, including financial expenditures, will be compiled by each task force/reference group and presented to the HCSP. The annual report of results and expenditures provides an opportunity to the HCSP to review and bring adjustments to the direction of the NRP.

Monitoring support is also envisioned to be provided by the HCSP Secretariat to ensure fully open and transparent results and financial reporting on all projects within the NRP. Reports prepared by the respective task force/reference group, will be submitted through the Secretariat for compilation to the HCSP.

**NRP Evaluation**

A mid-term evaluation of the NRP will take place by the middle of 2015 to review progress, identify gaps, and constraints and to derive lessons learned and recommendations. A final evaluation will take place towards the end of 2016, the evaluation will be independent and participatory in nature and take stock of the status and impact of the crisis on Jordan at that time and reflect on the effect of the NRP response interventions within each sector on mitigating its affects. Recommendations will be made at that time to conclude, extend, renew or redefine the NRP.
2. INVESTMENT RESPONSES

2.1 EDUCATION

SITUATION ANALYSIS
The GOJ has allowed all those who have missed less than three years of schooling to enrol, unburdened by school fees,\(^7\) in Jordanian schools in order to ensure that refugee children enjoy the right to basic education. As of 17 March 2014, 120,602 refugee children have enrolled in public schools; 99,612 in host communities, 20,990 in camps, and a further 8000 placed on waiting lists. In order to respond to the increased demand for education, second shifts were introduced in 78 schools, over 7000 additional teachers hired, 2,872 teachers specifically for double shifted and camp schools, three new schools built in refugee camps and additional prefab classrooms installed in 28 schools.

While the greatest effect of the crisis is seen in terms of the rapid expansion of the education system, the crisis is also likely to have less immediately visible effects on the quality of education. The introduction of double shifts in schools reduces the instructional time available to both shifts; larger classes and heightened levels of conflict and bullying in schools also affect the quality of the learning environment as do the many newly recruited teachers. While double shifting has been a critical factor in terms of job creation in the sector, these new recruits present a challenge in terms of training. Students’ exposure to traumatic incidents and the resulting effects on the capacity to learn, a wider spread of achievement levels and educational experiences all place additional pedagogic and classroom management demands on teachers.

Constraints and challenges facing the education sector as a result of the crisis in Syria
Since the onset of the crisis, government spending on education has increased by JOD200 million,\(^8\) with the bulk of this increase having been spent on primary and – to a lesser extent – on secondary education. From 2011 – 2013, the MOEd budget increased by 17 percent. It is estimated that 36 percent of the refugee population are school-aged children, (out of which an estimated 25 percent are eligible for formal education and 11 percent are not eligible) who will need to be provided with access to education. As of 2 December 2013, there are an estimated 30,000 children out of school who are eligible for formal education and 60,000 out-of-school children who are not eligible for formal education. As refugee numbers rise, so too will the demand for access to schools and alternative education programmes for those not enrolled in the formal system. It is anticipated that over the next three years, refugee numbers will rise further, placing additional pressure on the schooling system to retain those already enrolled and accommodate additional students. It needs to be recognized

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\(^7\) Associated school fees paid for by donors.

\(^8\) Expenditure has increased by JD200,573,500 since 2010. Figures supplied by Ministry of Education.
that in 2013 an estimated 35,000 children moved from private to public schools, further straining the system. This is a trend which is likely to continue as long as the economic environment continues to deteriorate.

The crisis has had an impact on the implementation of the GOJ’s long-term education reform strategy (Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy – ERfKE) although the quality of education has been an enduring concern, particularly in light of the declining scores on international assessment studies. The rapid expansion of the system has meant that it has not been possible to provide systematic training to newly appointed teachers, particularly those appointed on contract. The double shifting of schools has meant reduced time-on-task for each subject, further aggravating the quality delivery of teaching. The crisis has resulted in delays in key ERfKE implementations related to improving the quality of teacher candidates and related professional development and career path frameworks. This has a direct impact on the quality of education services and the achievement of ERfKE objectives.

A 2011 study found that 36 percent of schools were overcrowded, with the highest incidence of over-crowding in Mafraq, Irbid, Zarqa and Amman, which are also the four governorates in which refugee concentration is highest; a 2013 analysis undertaken by UNICEF and the MOE found that 41 percent of schools were overcrowded, with limited capacity to absorb additional students. Increased student numbers and the introduction of double shifts places greater strain on the educational infrastructure, particularly sanitation and hygiene facilities in schools, increasing maintenance demands and shortening the life-span of school furniture. While a stressed infrastructure is only one manifestation of the crisis, it contributes greatly to quality and must be addressed.

It is unclear how the crisis has affected already under-served groups, particularly the coverage and quality of pre-school or kindergarten programmes, and the quality of educational support provided to children with special educational needs. There is insufficient data to support effective planning for service delivery to out-of-school boys and girls (children and youth).

**Baseline indicators (2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Indicator</th>
<th>2012/2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of schools (public, private, UNRWA, Military Culture)</td>
<td>6,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of MOE schools</td>
<td>3,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of enrolled students in all schools (excluding Syrians)</td>
<td>1,725,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of enrolled students in MOE schools (excluding Syrians)</td>
<td>1,173,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of teachers (all managing authorities)</td>
<td>110,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of double shift schools</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of students in double shift schools</td>
<td>231,494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overview of the humanitarian response
The humanitarian response in host communities, led by UNICEF, has sought to ensure that all boys and girls (children and youth) have access to education and has therefore focused on assisting the MOEd to increase the absorption capacity of the system through the introduction of second shifts in selected schools, provision of additional learning spaces (through school construction and prefabricated classrooms) and small-scale school renovation. Vulnerable boys and girls have also been provided with school uniforms and basic school supplies. Several organisations have offered supplementary instruction programmes in order to prepare children for entry into the school system. Training has been offered to newly-appointed teachers and teachers in schools hosting large numbers of Syrian students (approximately 2,550 teachers in 2013); training has also been offered to 450 MOEd officials to enhance their capacity to support teachers in schools affected by the crisis.

At the same time, it is recognized that there are considerable numbers of boys and girls who may never filter through the formal system requiring the provision of effective non-formal (NFE) and informal education opportunities. More data are needed to better disaggregate the profile and assess the needs of these boys and girls. The MOEd has developed a certified NFE program which can be delivered through centres attached to public schools or through home-schooling. Given the current crises, there is a need to build on and scale-up this already successful NFE program. The humanitarian response has also sought to assist out-of-school boys and girls (children and youth) through informal and non-formal education programmes, but this component needs considerable scaling up—given the numbers of children ineligible for formal schooling. The humanitarian response has focused on the immediate needs of both refugees and the education system in order to cope with increased levels of demand. It, however, does not have the remit to address longer-term development implications of the rapid expansion of the system on educational quality or to ensure that progress made in implementing systemic reform strategies (particularly the ERfKE programme) is not negatively affected.

SECTOR OBJECTIVES
The NRP contributes directly to the GOJ’s ability to provide access to quality inclusive education for all children—particularly the most vulnerable—through formal, non-formal and informal opportunities. This is equally the focus of Jordan’s ERfKE program (Phase 1 2004-2009, Phase 2 2010-2015) and also the focus of the 2013-2020 National Poverty Strategy (NPS). ERfKE’s over-riding goal is to reform the public education sector so it produces graduates able to contribute to Jordan’s development through a knowledge economy. Both ERfKE and the NPS recognize the need to strengthen the delivery of basic education (grades K-10) access and quality as the foundation for a healthy democratic society.

Specific Objective 1: Strengthening the capacity of the MOEd to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.
Specific Objective 2: Ensuring access to quality educational services for all boys and girls, particularly those living in areas that have been most affected and made more vulnerable by the refugee crisis

At the foundation of these strategic objectives is the ability of the GOJ and its MOEd to respond to emergencies such as socioeconomic and political shocks with efficient surge modalities. This plan will strengthen the GOJ’s resilience capacity to apply lessons learned from the past refugee crises, ensuring adaptability and quality of its education system to any new crisis context. This must happen on two fronts.

First, the readiness and ability of the MOEd to respond to sudden man-made and natural crises through the development of an emergency focused policy and resources framework, and an enhanced information management system to support strategic response planning. Second, the continued delivery of quality education services for all children based on two main pillars: access to and quality of education (formal, non-formal and informal) through the expansion of the absorptive capacity of schools in most affected areas; and the professional development (both induction and in-service) on inclusive education and psychosocial support as well as social cohesion topics to ensure a conducive learning environment.

RESPONSE PLAN
Specific Objective 1: Strengthening the capacity of the MOEd to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.

Rationale: Over the last few decades Jordan has received successive waves of refugees as conflicts intensified in different parts of the region. It is anticipated that Jordan will retain its position as a relatively safe and stable country, which will make it a suitable refuge for asylum seekers. There are no systems or procedures in place which can be replicated in the event of natural or man-made emergencies. EMIS must be able to produce accurate and reliable data to effectively prioritize and plan at all levels so as to ensure better MOEd responsiveness. The MOEd has embarked on improving its EMIS capabilities, but generating reports in times of emergencies will require system upgrades. The need for specialized training of emergency preparedness has not been met.

It is therefore suggested that in order to build Jordan’s resilience to these events, strategies, policy options, human resources and information management and utilizations systems be strengthened in order to lessen the impact of emergencies (both natural and conflict-related) on the delivery of educational services.

Project Summary 1.1: Strengthen the capacity of the MOEd to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.

Specific Objective 2:
Ensuring access to quality educational services for all boys and girls, particularly those living in areas that have been most affected and made more vulnerable by the refugee crisis

Rationale: At a time of crisis, the government is responsible for ensuring service delivery to both its citizens and also refugees. One of the priorities during such periods is to ensure that the quality of services, particularly in poor and under-served areas, does not deteriorate.

Project Summary 2.1: Increase the absorptive capacity and utilization of schools.

Project Summary 2.2: Enhance and expand the provision of early childhood education in most vulnerable communities.

Project Summary 2.3: Provide teacher training and professional development in emergencies.

Project Summary 2.4: Establish alternative, certified pathways for out-of-school boys and girls (children and youth).

Project Summary 2.5: Create violence-free schools that cater to psycho-social needs of boys and girls (children and youth).

Project Summary 2.6: Minimise barriers to school attendance for vulnerable boys and girls (children and youth)

PROJECT SUMMARIES
The project summary table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the project summary sheets included in Annex 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 1: Strengthening the capacity of the MOEd to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 1.1 MOEd Enhanced Institutional Capacity</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 2: Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly those living in areas that have been most affected and made more vulnerable by the refugee crisis</td>
<td>156,680,000</td>
<td>173,850,000</td>
<td>205,950,000</td>
<td>536,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 ISACU</td>
<td>Increasing School Absorptive Capacity and Utilization</td>
<td>99,000,000</td>
<td>115,600,000</td>
<td>148,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 ECDVC</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development in Vulnerable Communities</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 TTP</td>
<td>Teachers Training Program</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 ACEPP</td>
<td>Alternative Certified Education Pathways</td>
<td>2,080,000</td>
<td>1,950,000</td>
<td>1,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 VFS</td>
<td>Violence Free Schools</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 EA2EO</td>
<td>Equal Access to Education Opportunities</td>
<td>51,500,000</td>
<td>51,500,000</td>
<td>51,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>157,230,000</td>
<td>175,050,000</td>
<td>206,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 ENERGY

SITUATION ANALYSIS
Jordan has been facing a convergence of supply disruptions of energy imports from Egypt, alongside rising local demands in Jordan owing to a large influx of Syrian refugees and forced migrants. While not a primary driver of systemic energy sector challenges in Jordan, the Syrian crisis is a significant exacerbating factor. Given the centrality of energy to the public budget, and risks from rising energy costs to the State budget, decreasing fiscal space to respond to overall development challenges could jeopardize the trajectory of the country unless urgent actions are taken. Securing a sustainable energy pathway is thus critical for achieving all goals of the NRP, with solutions for energy demand and supply challenges a top priority from both short-term and medium-term perspectives.

In terms of energy supply, Jordan has traditionally relied for 80 percent of its electricity generation on natural gas imported from Egypt, but this has declined by up to 70 percent in recent times. In response, Jordan shifted to crude oil imports, rising to 42 percent of energy imports in 2012\(^9\) and adding approximately US$2 billion/year to Jordan’s import bill\(^10\) with overall energy costs likely to reach US$18 billion in 2013.\(^11\) This decreases fiscal space to respond to overall social development and resilience goals.

In terms of energy demand trends, residential consumption rose 9.44 percent from 2011 to 2012, compared to just 5.9 percent growth 2010 to 2011. Meanwhile, diesel consumption rose 34.48 percent from 2010 to 2011; and 22.43 percent from 2011 to 2012; kerosene 8 percent from 2010 to 2011, and 7.41 percent from 2011 to 2012; and oil consumption rose 11.98 percent from 2011 to 2012.\(^12\) This further burdens Jordan’s energy subsidy system, with the 2013 electricity subsidy bill expected to be US$1.8 billion, almost matching Jordan’s forecasted 2013 deficit of US$2 billion.

Around 600,000 Syrians have so far arrived in Jordan. The numbers are projected to increase to 800,000 Syrians during 2014 according to UNHCR forecasts.\(^13\) This would reflect a cumulative addition of approximately 13 percent to the national population of approximately 6.38 million.\(^14\) Around 80 percent of Syrians now reside in Jordan’s cities and towns, adding pressure to residential energy consumption, including demands on the power grid and needs for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for domestic cooking, the only fuel derivative which remains subsidized by the government.\(^15\) Meanwhile 20 percent of Syrians inhabit refugee camps in the north of Jordan, including the Za’atari Camp, now the world’s second largest refugee camp and the fourth largest settlement in Jordan.

\(^9\) Department of Statistics, quoted http://english.nuqudy.com/Levant/Jordan%E2%80%99s_Energy_Cri-
\(^10\) See http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/13/imf-jordan-idUSL1N0I208M20131013
\(^12\) Yusuf Mansur, Data compiled from Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, October 2013, Amman.
While there is diversity within the Syrian community in Jordan, according to government statistics average per capita energy intensity among Syrians living in cities and towns is 25 percent less than that of the general population. As refugees and forced migrants, many fall within the lower-income bracket and utilize energy access for basic household needs, while some retain higher levels of income and energy consumption levels. Syrian refugees and forced migrants on average remain less impactful on the broad energy challenges in Jordan relative to core energy users in the country. While as noted above there has been a residential energy consumption rise of 9.4 percent from 2011 to 2012, compared to just 5.9 percent growth from 2010 to 2011, the share of this attributable to Syrian refugees and forced migrants has yet to be defined in trend analyses.

In response to the Syrian crisis, new public expenditures have been made in 2012 and 2013, with over US$251 million allocated in 2012 for services and basic needs for Syrians in cities and communities in the form of regular expenditures and specific subsidies. In 2013, this cost could reach over US$851.5 million, with the GOJ estimating further needs of US$152.4 million to further expand public services in 2013 to the growing Syrian population. Of this latter figure, 72 percent would be needed for energy services, including US$93.6 million for electricity and US$16.6 million for household cooking gas.

**SECTOR OBJECTIVES**

The objective is to scale up and accelerate responses to Jordan’s energy crisis in a way that addresses incremental demand pressures from Syrian refugees and forced migrants. Within Jordan’s broad strategy for transformational change in both energy supply and demand dynamics, two key objectives of relevance to the Syrian crisis are: (i) sustainable energy solutions to meet rising residential energy demands in the short-term, and (ii) expand renewable energy solutions to growing pressures for energy supply expansion in the medium-term.

The long-term vision to shift to a broader energy supply mix is reflected in the National Energy Strategy, including a diversification of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports from alternative sources in the region, alongside exploring new oil import options and shale potentials. From the service provision perspective, recent times have also seen significant reforms to Jordan’s domestic energy subsidy system, shifting from universal subsidies to increased use instead of cash transfers targeted to those in need of support, now reaching 70 percent of the national population.

A top national objective to increasing energy security is the goal of scaling-up sustainable energy solutions including renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions. The new 2013 Arab Future Energy Index (AFEX) shows how Jordan is making positive progress, now

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17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
ranked 2nd in the Arab region for renewable energy trends and 3rd for energy efficiency. The 2012 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Law is now a key enabler providing incentives for sustainable energy solutions as Jordan has the objective of growth of renewable energy from one percent of energy mix in 2010 to 10 percent by 2020 and energy efficiency expansion by 20 percent by 2020. The new 2013 National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) is a key policy tool in this regard, identifying interventions to achieve Jordan's sustainable energy goals. The objective of this plan is to support those identified responses which can be scaled up and accelerated, in order to address emerging risks from the Syrian crisis.

The convergence of rising energy consumption trends alongside decreasing security of energy supply is impacting public budgets, fiscal space for broader development goals, and ability to ensure energy services. With the Syria crisis exacerbating this situation, this plan proposes sustainable energy solutions at both short-term and medium-term levels with the goal of accelerating and scaling-up energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions. With Syria crisis impacts likely to remain uncertain for some time, additional pressures on energy systems can be expected in coming years. Acceleration of energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions can be of great benefit in this regard, helping to reduce the social and economic risks of growing energy insecurity.

**RESPONSE PLAN**

With regards to increased energy demands from Syrian refugees and forced migrants in cities and towns, two key response options are suggested: (i) acceleration of energy efficiency and renewable energy measures in buildings and residences across Jordan to offset increased power demands from the Syrian crisis (short-term coping), and (ii) establishing new renewable energy power supply capacities to bolster pressures on the power grid (medium-term, from recovering to sustaining).

The GOJ foresees additional power demand in cities and towns as a result of the Syrian crisis to be approximately 225MW, with estimated capital investment to meet this additional demand estimated at US$337.5 million. Separate to this are needs for bringing power to the Zaatari Camp including new power needs of 46MW costing US$14 million in capital costs and US$5.6 million per month in operational costs. With regard to expanding access to water in the Zaatari Camp, the GOJ also estimates a demand in power of 500 kilowatt needed to power two planned wells for the camp, which sits over the country’s largest aquifer. Within this process, renewable energy options could be explored based on initial successes by the donor community in supporting solar lighting in Zaatari Camp and solar energy in Azraq Camp.

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Given the estimated levels of incremental power needed for response to the Syrian crisis of 225MW for cities/towns, responses can align to and benefit from the new strategic investments planned within Jordan’s overall drive for sustainable energy solutions. Instead of developing new import-dependent power capacities, the suggestion is to meet extra loads through energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions. A focus on accelerating energy efficiency and renewable energy gains in strategic sectors would be a sustainable and resilient approach to freeing power capacity and offsetting new power demands from the Syrian crisis. For this reason, the proposed project summaries include operations and maintenance aspects which assure ownership.

The project summaries also address public awareness, energy saving and advocacy, and proper training, and focus on women as the main user affecting energy consumption. In households, special attention is given also to the proper disposal of used lighting fixtures that contain hazardous parts which will be undertaken in coordination with the Ministry of Environment.

**Prioritisation**

One significant deployable and low-cost priority in line with the 2013 NEEAP is to install 38,000 solar water heaters in buildings and residences (cost of US$35.34 million), freeing up 73MW and reducing electricity costs by US$20 million.\(^{26}\) A second significant deployable and low-cost priority would be to replace 3 million inefficient lights in residences and buildings with new compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) (cost of US$14.8 million), freeing up 144MW of power in the years 2014 and 2015, while also creating US$50 million in energy subsidy savings.

Both solar water heaters and CFLs have a good basis for production and with deployment readily available locally in Jordan, these two very cost-effective priorities from the NEEAP could be rapidly implemented in 2014-15 to free up 58 percent of new Syrian crisis-related energy demand in the year 2014 and up to the full need in the year after 2015. Further scaling up of these capacities planned in 2015-16 could fully cover all new energy demands expected from the Syrian crisis, and would be also bring long-term benefits for Jordan’s sustainable energy vision, outlasting the risks from the Syrian crisis.

Addressing new demands in ways that do not built up greater levels of energy import dependence would be a strategic approach. Rapid energy efficiency and renewable energy gains could also be coupled with a third priority – the expansion of new grid-connected concentrated solar power (CSP) capacities with more medium-term benefits given what may be more long-term impacts of the Syrian crisis. The new 2012 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Law enables more rapid deployment of CSP and related solutions, with support helping accelerate on-going plans to generate 1,000MW of solar power over the coming several years. Through support for a small-scale pilot CSP initiative, 10MW of this intended capacity (US$60 million for investment costs) could be accelerated as part of the Syria crisis response to meet the new power loads among host communities in cities, and

could also bring co-benefits to large camps like Zaatari and other poor communities in the country.

**PROJECT SUMMARIES**
The project summary table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the project summary sheets included in Annex 1.

Table 5: Energy Sector Project Summaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
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<td>45,290,000</td>
<td>36,600,000</td>
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</table>
2.3 HEALTH

SITUATION ANALYSIS

From a health perspective there are a number of important implications of the Syrian crisis for the sector. These relate to: (i) the immediate increased prevalence and risk of diseases among Jordanian host communities; (ii) the increased demands placed on health services, infrastructure and medicines, with commensurate financial consequences; (iii) a projected reversal in some of the most important indicators of health anchored in the MDGs.

The full impact of the influx of such large numbers of Syrian refugees is not yet known. However, a notable increase in the infectious diseases incidence rate in Jordan such as TB, measles, hepatitis A, cutaneous leishmaniasis, respiratory tract infection, diarrhea, and other notifiable diseases have been reported. The potential reappearance of polio in Jordan also presents a risk as some polio cases have been detected in Syria. Twelve percent of Syrians suffer from diabetes mellitus, 30 percent suffer of hypertension, and a growing number of Syrians have needed kidney dialysis. Furthermore, war-related health conditions such as traumas, amputations, bullet wounds, and mental disorders were also registered.

The GOJ is not only faced with the challenge of meeting the financial gap required to cover the healthcare costs of Syrian refugees, but also with responding to the urgent health care needs of Jordanian host communities. The greatest challenges relate to meeting the heightened demand for health services through the extension of services and/or expansion of facilities. In parallel, accelerating efforts to protect the significant progress Jordan has achieved towards reaching national goals as well as MDGs by the year 2015, which Ministry of Health (MOH) officials suggest have already been jeopardised.

In sum, the influx of Syrian refugees places significant additional pressure on an already under-resourced MOH healthcare delivery system. These can be summarized as follows:

Human resources for health (HRH): The five northern Jordanian governorates (Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa, Jarash and Ajloun) reported severe shortages in the following specialties: dermatology, gynaecology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, functional therapy, emergency, orthopaedic, anaesthesiology, internal, ophthalmology, family medicine, paediatrics and dentistry. This situation has resulted in a sharp increase of the daily workload of existing specialists, which cannot be sustained at their current levels of demand.

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30Directorate of Non-Communicable Diseases records. MOH, 2013
33Reports submitted from health directorates in the field. MOH, 2013.
Drugs, medicines and vaccines: All five governorates reported serious deficiencies in the supply of vaccines, delivery-related medications, cardio-vascular drugs and oral rehydration therapy.

Medical equipment: Clinics throughout all five governorates reported variations in access to medical equipment. Most lacking were delivery tables, delivery sets, vacuum extractors, emergency trolleys, pulse oximeters, antenatal, and postnatal equipment in addition to equipment needed for surgical, orthopaedic, internal, radiation departments, and medical laboratories in order to maintain an acceptable level of health care delivery.

Capacity of facilities (hospitals and health centres): Some hospitals such as Princess Basma, Princess Rahma, Ramtha (Irbid Governorate) and Mafraq hospital have recorded 100 percent bed occupancy rates. At the health centre level, the daily workload has increased by up to 50 percent in some centres in Ajloun, and up to 9 percent in other governorates.

Direct cost of the treatment of Syrian refugees: The estimate for 2013 was around US$167 million while the cost of purchasing additional drugs and vaccines to meet the increased demands was US$58.1 million. These costs are exclusive of recently recruited additional doctors and nurses, and associated infrastructure costs.

Government response
Although the Jordanian healthcare sector faces significant financial and logistical challenges, the GOJ’s policy is to grant Syrian refugees free access to national health care services as per the Cabinet Decree of 16 May 2012. In order to meet the increased demand for health services, the MOH mobilized additional human resources to serve in the most affected areas and almost doubled its procurement of vaccines also with the support of international agencies. Overall drug procurement increased by 18 percent to keep pace with actual needs. In order to cope with the increased flow of patients that the crisis has given rise to, the MOH has set out an urgent plan to rehabilitate some of its existing facilities and infrastructure within the areas most affected. In the main, the programme will entail making better use or expansion of existing facilities. As a last resort, and in some exceptional instances where demand greatly outstrips capacity, new facilities will be constructed.

Humanitarian response
The influx of Syrian refugees to Jordan since 2011 has resulted in a massive collaborative effort between the donor community, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, community-based organizations, refugees, and Jordanian communities. The humanitarian response includes direct and indirect interventions; technical and financial assistance, aimed at strengthening the health system in service delivery capacity; strengthening coordination capacity; and responding to the rising trends of communicable and

34 Joint Rapid Health Facility Capacity and Utilization Assessment (RHFCUA), 2013
35 Biomedical Engineering Directorate. MOH. December, 2013.
non-communicable diseases risks among both Syrian refugees and their Jordanian host communities.

**Problem statement**

Jordan is host to nearly 600,000 Syrian refugees, a high percentage of whom are women, children, and the elderly, and 80 percent of whom live in non-camp settings in rural and urban areas. The majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan are highly vulnerable due to their hard socio-economic, health, and psychological situation. This influx has placed additional strains on an already stressed system due to the structural financial and economic crisis Jordan faces. Thus, the Jordanian health system falls into a three-dimensional dilemma. That is:

1. How to cover the financial gap required to cover the healthcare needs of Syrian refugees;
2. How to retain sufficient capacity to respond to healthcare needs of Jordanian host communities, and;
3. How to maintain the significant progress in health that Jordan has achieved over the past decade in order to reach its national targets as well as MDGs by the year 2015.

**RESPONSE PLAN**

**General points:**

- MOH has a unique network of hospitals and health centres dispersed throughout the Kingdom. First priority should be given to supporting existing facilities with emphasis on rural areas and where possible to expanding MOH facilities rather than create new ones.

- Due to high concentration of Syrian refugees in the northern governorates and the high percentage of poor households in Irbid, Amman, Maafra, Jerash, and Ajloun governorates, any response strategy should give priority to these areas which are experiencing the highest rates of demand.

- In order to integrate Syrian refugees’ health information and data into the Jordanian Health management Information system (HMIS), strengthening HMIS is of high importance.

- It is important to strengthen the existing overall health system in Jordan rather than create a new one for refugees alone, as refugees utilise all Jordanian health facilities in all subsectors.

Recognizing that primary health care is the most cost effective approach to achieving health system goals, the following response options should be implemented:

- Strengthening of existing primary healthcare programs, including reproductive health programs, school health, new-born screening program, ante and post-natal services, and integrated mental health programs, etc.
Scaling-up primary and comprehensive health centres as a primary point of contact with local communities.

- Establishment of outreach clinics and activities.
- Strengthening of the existing referral system.
- Building the technical and managerial capacities of HRH.
- Maintenance of optimal medical staff and hospitals bed density in affected communities.

**SECTOR OBJECTIVES**

**Overall Sector Objective:** To improve the health of citizens residing in the areas most affected by the Syrian crisis.

**Specific Objective 1:** Urgent financial support to MOH budget provided to cover the cost incurred as a result of Syrian crisis.

*Project Summary 1.1: Provision of direct financial support to the MOH.*

**Specific Objective 2:** Ensuring that human resources gaps in medical specialties are filled in areas with high concentration of Syrians

*Project Summary 2.1: Supporting staffing of MOH facilities*

**Specific Objective 3:** Absorptive capacities of MOH hospitals and health centres, especially in areas with high concentration of Syrians, scaled up

*Project Summary 3.1: Increasing the absorptive capacity of MOH facilities in areas with a high concentration of Syrians*

**Specific Objective 4:** Critical equipment, ambulances and vehicles needed to MOH hospitals and health centres provided

*Project Summary 4.1: Supporting MOH capacity in terms of emergency equipment and vehicles*

**Specific Objective 5:** Strengthening MoH non-communicable disease control to cover the sudden increase of population incurred by the Syrian refugee influx

*Project Summary 5.1: Supporting non-communicable disease control*

**PROJECT SUMMARIES**

The Project Summary Table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the Project Summary Sheets in Annex 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 1: Urgent financial support to MOH budget provided to cover the cost incurred as a result of Syrian crisis.</th>
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<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
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<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
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<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>-</td>
<td>4,060,600</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 5: Strengthening MoH non-communicable disease control to cover the sudden increase of population incurred by the Syrian refugee influx</th>
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<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
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<td>837,000</td>
<td>822,000</td>
<td>2,926,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 138,623,600 | 177,834,000 | 152,469,000 | 468,926,600 |
2.4 HOUSING

SITUATION ANALYSIS

The Syrian crisis is unfolding amidst a chronic shortage of affordable housing in Jordan. The humanitarian response has been impressive, providing shelter assistance to an estimated 73,508 Syrians families as of November 2013. Nevertheless, the lack of adequate and affordable housing has emerged as one of the two main causes of social tension between Syrian refugees and host communities. If properly supported, the housing sector has the potential to contribute to a wide range of positive outcomes, including: physical security, reduced social tension, increased employment and economic growth, and increased tax revenue for the Government of Jordan. The NRP advocates (i) expanded support for humanitarian shelter, particularly those initiatives that bring additional housing units onto the market; (ii) a large scale affordable housing programme involving private-public partnership; and (iii) institutional reform to address structural weaknesses in the housing market.

The influx of Syrian refugees is severely straining the absorption capacity of the Jordanian housing market. Based on Ministry of Interior (MOI) figures, some 600,000 Syrians in Jordan need housing, which translates into approximately 120 thousand units. The Jordanian housing sector, meanwhile, has produced an annual average of 28,600 units during the period 2004-11 against a total demand of 32,000 units. Moreover, supply is not well aligned with demand, with an oversupply at the middle and upper end of the market and some 18 percent of the housing stock remaining unoccupied. As a result, rental has been the main source of affordable housing for almost half of the poorest 10 percent of Jordan’s population.

The immediate humanitarian response has focused on camp settings with some support extended to host communities. As of November 2013, UNHCR estimated that some 420,000 refugees (or 80 percent of the then 567,000 registered refugee population) live outside camps. Zaatari has been upgraded to an infrastructure and basic services camp capable of hosting some 110 thousand people. A new camp, Azraq, has also been developed, capable of hosting 52,000 people. For host families, 1,326 unfinished homes have been completed and cash support for rent has been provided for highly vulnerable households. For the second half of 2013, 61 percent of the targeted population was reached with shelter support,

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36 Estimate based on UNHCR Jordan RRP5 Update Sept 2013. Notes: (i) the September update includes figures for October and November 2013; (ii) the global figure does not include cash support for rent, which benefits Jordanian host families. Final figures for 2013 will be available in early 2014.
37 CARE Jordan, Syrian Refugees in Urban Jordan: Rapid Participatory Community Assessment, April 2013. Competition for jobs is reported as the second.
38 UNHCR Jordan Response Plan uses a planning figure of 5 people per refugee household, while ACTED (2013) reports an average Syrian refugee household size of 7.12.
39 Department of Statistics (DOS) and HUDC 2004-2011 Housing Sector Report
40 Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), Urban and Housing Indicators, August 2013.
41 HUDC Urban and Housing Indicators, August 2013.
42 UNHCR (2013) Jordan Response Plan
43 A joint Government of Jordan and UNHCR verification process in November 2013 estimated that some 75,000 refugees were living in the camp.
44 UNHCR (2013) Jordan Response Plan
mainly through camps. An increased focus on host communities is foreseen in the 2014 Jordan Regional Response Plan (RRP6) shelter strategy.

The 2013 NAR noted that available vacant housing stock has largely been exhausted. The supply side response has included: increasing rental prices, sub-dividing existing units, converting basements, garages, storage spaces and farm buildings into rental accommodation, and some construction of rental units by private individuals. To date there has been no large scale private sector response, despite the fact that the construction sector alone accounts for 5 percent of Jordan’s GDP. Meanwhile the government, including the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) has been reluctant to engage with this issue, as their mandate is focused on housing for Jordanians, not Syrians.

Some of the negative impacts of the Syrian crisis include the following:

**Depletion of household savings:** According to CARE, rental prices have reportedly increased in the north from pre-crisis levels of approximately JOD50 per month to JOD101-200 per month, with rent being the single largest item of household expenditure.

**Evictions of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families:** While no quantitative data are available, anecdotal reports suggest a rise in the eviction of tenants by landlords in search of higher rents.

**Increased tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanians:** Competition for affordable housing and jobs represent the two chief sources of tension between refugees and host communities. The two issues are related. High rents compel refugees to seek work in the informal sector. This surge in labour supply is lowering salaries. There are also reports that the shortage of housing means that young men cannot get married, as they do not have a house for their new family.

**Increase in sub-standard shelter solutions and growth of informal settlements:** As families’ savings are depleted, they compromise on their choice of shelter solution, resulting in over-crowding, unhealthy living environments, and contributing to increased domestic violence.

**Strained urban infrastructure and services:** Solid waste management, water supply, waste water treatment, roads, schools, clinics can no longer cope with the surge in population. Guiding the location of new housing to align with infrastructure and service expansion will be critical.

47 Care Jordan, Syrian Refugees in Urban Jordan: Rapid Participatory Community Assessment, April 2013.
**Urban sprawl:** Jordanians with access to land are building housing to rent to refugees. While the supply side increase is necessary, if left unguided, this process can lead to urban sprawl and dramatically increase the cost of extending infrastructure and services.

It is clear that the Syrian refugee crisis has severely strained the supply of affordable housing for both refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families alike. There has been no significant government response to date, either through direct provision of housing or through the creation of incentives for the private sector to engage at scale. The humanitarian response has focused largely on camp-based solutions and has not been able to meet the broader shelter needs of off-campus refugees and host communities. This has left ordinary Syrians and Jordanians to lead the response. While Jordanian hospitality has been generous, this generosity is reaching its limits.

**Problem statement:** The Syrian crisis has exacerbated the shortage of affordable housing in Jordan, raising rental prices, increasing social tension, straining urban infrastructure and services and contributing to unsustainable settlement growth.

**SECTOR OBJECTIVES**

**Overall Sector Objective:** Vulnerable Jordanian households have improved access to affordable and adequate housing within a housing sector that helps meet the housing needs of all Jordanians.

**Specific Objective 1:** Vulnerable Jordanian households have increased access to affordable and adequate housing.

**Specific Objective 2:** Housing-related institutions, regulations and policies enable housing markets to meet the needs of all Jordanians, including vulnerable groups.

These objectives are designed to complement expected humanitarian shelter programming in a way that addresses the structural issues affecting the housing sector in Jordan. At the end of the three year NRP period, the initiatives initiated under the NRP will be institutionalized to enable the work to continue independent of additional grant finance.

**Indicators**

The following indicators will be used to measure progress towards these objectives.

**Indicator 1:** Number of affordable housing units produced annually in the areas most heavily impacted areas of the north.

**Indicator 2:** Number of vulnerable Jordanian households/people with access to affordable and adequate housing options attributable to a national programme.

**Indicator 3:** Sixty percent beneficiary satisfaction rate with the quality of the affordable housing (owner and tenant).
**Indicator 4:** Number of affordable housing loans outstanding under a national programme.

**Indicator 5:** Priority legal, regulator, and institutional issues affecting the housing sector are addressed.

**RESPONSE PLAN**

**Response options**

To meet the two objectives outlined above, the response options include: (i) the coping strategies of Jordanian host communities – the main actors responsible for addressing shelter and housing needs; (ii) private sector led initiatives; (iii) humanitarian shelter strategies; and (iv) government-backed initiatives. The response options were developed through a two-month process that included three large stakeholder meetings involving the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), two municipalities, the Developers Association, the Engineers Association, Land department, UN Agencies, and international and national NGOs from the humanitarian shelter sector. Bilateral meetings were also held with the Central Bank, commercial banks, and international financial institutions (IFIs).

**Shelter Strategies of Refugees and Host Communities**

Individual Jordanian host communities will be responsible for delivering the bulk of affordable housing in 2014. Building permit data from the NAR suggest that Jordanians may have built some 3,700 to 5,600 additional units in Mafraq since the start of the refugee crisis.49 Irbid Municipality reports a 10 to 20 percent increase in building permits issued. These figures suggest that individual Jordanians are investing in new housing construction, but not at significant scale. Accordingly, this response will not lead to a significant increase in the production of affordable housing (objective 1), nor will it address institutional issues in the housing sector (objective 2).

**Humanitarian Response**

Humanitarian shelter strategies are summarized in the 2014 Jordan RRP6. The plan projects a total refugee population of 800,000 by the end of 2014, an increase of nearly 250,000 from the total number of refugees registered in November 2013. This includes some 197,000 women (26 percent), 167,000 men (21 percent), 210,000 girls (26 percent) and 218,000 boys (27 percent).50

On this basis, of the 800,000 refugees, the plan assumes that 75 percent of refugees will be accommodated outside camps (600,000), while 25 percent will be accommodated inside camps (200,000). The camp solution will meet international humanitarian standards for camps. As such, they will contribute to the affordable housing supply (objective 1), albeit on

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a temporary basis as these units are designed to be disassembled and eventually taken back to Syria. They will not contribute to meeting the annual national demand of 32,000 housing units in Jordan.

Of the 600,000 non-camp refugees, which is based on MOI figures, the plan targets 30 percent of the most vulnerable families for support (180,000 people or 36,000 households). Support to families hosting Syrian refugees includes three main tracks:

1. Upgrading sub-standard shelter to SPHERE standards through repair of broken walls, windows, improved sanitation, etc. (US$2,500 per refugee family accommodated). The target figure for this option is 9,900 households.

2. Adaptation of unfinished units/buildings: (US$2,500 per refugee family accommodated). The target figure for this option is 12,600 households.

3. Winterization support.

Beyond this 36,000 target population, two additional response options are proposed:

1. Conditional cash support for most vulnerable families (3 months; JOD120/hh/month)

2. Information and legal assistance to support refugees rights, including their right to housing.

Option 1 will increase the number of adequate units, but will not increase the overall affordable housing stock. Option 2 will bring new stock onto the market and will relieve some pressure on the demand side. Option 4, short term cash assistance, should not have a significant market impact if limited in scale and carefully targeted to the most vulnerable families. Option 5, information and legal assistance, can play a critical role in reducing evictions and social tension. It will also support legal and policy advocacy, but is not meant to deliver long-term institutional reform.

It is worth noting that this assessment is based on the assumption that the shelter sector will be fully funded. The 2013RRP (RRP5) for Jordan, however, was only 61 percent funded as at November 2013. In addition, the shelter response, as noted above, was broadly oriented towards camp solutions.

While the above data is incomplete, it is clear that even if fully funded, less than 50 percent of the total needs for adequate and affordable shelter will be met. Two additional response strategies are discussed below: private sector engagement and targeted government support.

**Government of Jordan Response**

The GOJ has several on-going programmes in the housing sector focusing on affordable housing. The Royal Initiative “Decent Housing for Decent Living,” has produced 8,448 units since its launch in 2008, of which 52 percent have been sold. The HUDC has a regular
programmes of providing serviced plots of land throughout the Kingdom with an average of 1,000 plots annually.

The Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) has two housing related programmes. The first provides housing units to the most vulnerable Jordanian families at a 100 percent subsidy through either the provision of new units or the rehabilitation of existing units. Around 1,500 units have been provided through this programme since its start in 2002. The second, called the Al-Afeefa Families programme, consists of small developments of 15 to 30 units each; 100 of these projects have been implemented throughout the Kingdom since 2006. Some 1,800 units have been completed and handed-over to date. For the NRP, the MOSD is proposing a three year programme to construct 5,000 housing units for the most vulnerable Jordanian families for US$157 million dollars (for more information on this programme please see Chapter 2.7 of the NRP).

The Department for Palestinian Affairs, with the MOPIC, has a rehabilitation programme for Palestinian refugees living in camps. The programme has been active since 2005 and has rehabilitated more than 300 units. An additional 300 units are programmed for rehabilitation in the coming three years.

**Private Sector and Public-Private-Partnership Response**

Despite their significant capacity, the private sector has not yet engaged in the refugee response. Meetings held with key housing sector stakeholders, including contractors, investors, the land department and the HUDC have identified the following challenges in the housing sector: (i) the high cost and poor location of available land, particularly around Amman; (ii) the lack of suitable mortgage products; (iii) high levels of security required by banks when giving loans to lower-income groups; (iv) high cost of labour; (v) building codes and regulation that are not geared to deliver affordable housing; and (vi) Jordanian expectations that a housing unit must be 120 square meters in size, with three bedrooms.

The private sector actors also offered different solutions to the above challenges and confirmed their willingness to work with the government and the banking sector to develop new models for affordable housing delivery. Collaboration between these sectors holds significant promise.

One model that has been discussed is a large-scale affordable housing programme. The aim is to produce 30,000 new units of affordable housing through a partnership between the GOJ, the construction sector and Jordanian banks. Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families will be able to rent adequate and affordable housing. Jordanian landlords, meanwhile, will ultimately benefit by increasing their household assets and more rapidly paying down mortgages. The GOJ will also benefit from increased tax revenue from sales tax, building permits and property tax. More broadly, the initiative will stimulate growth in the construction and banking sectors. As Syrian labourers are active in the construction
sector,\textsuperscript{51,52} it is likely that the initiative will also increase the household incomes of Syrian refugees.

The programme will contribute to the easing of tensions between Syrian refugees and host communities. Many Jordanians feel that “aid has not been distributed in a fair manner… [in] blatant disregard of the Jordanian community’s needs.”\textsuperscript{53} Through this initiative Jordanians will benefit from long-term asset accumulation, property being the preferred savings vehicle. Young Jordanian men will also be able to marry and start a family, as additional housing units are brought onto the market.

**Government institutional, legal and policy reforms to support affordable housing**

To complement these interventions, and to address some of the long-term structural challenges in the housing sector, a programme of legal, institutional and policy reform is also required. The affordable housing programme described in section (iii) above will proceed independent of these reforms, but its lessons will inform the sector reforms.

Activities will include: the preparation of a new national housing strategy to replace the one developed in 1989; the adoption of new housing law, clarifying the respective roles of the public and private sectors; and strengthening the capacity of the HUDC, and related institutions, in line with the new policy and law.

**Prioritisation**

For government, humanitarian and development partners interested in simultaneously impacting issues of shelter, social cohesion, unemployment, economic development, municipal services and government revenue, the housing sector represents a strategic entry point.

It is also evident from the analysis above that the housing component of the NRP must integrate humanitarian and development responses. The massive scale of the refugee influx, combined with the lead-time required to increase the supply of adequate and affordable housing, necessitates the continued engagement of humanitarian actors, quite possibly through the entire NRP period. The challenge lies in coordinating the interventions to ensure short-term needs are met while also addressing supply-side shortages and institutional issues.

Interventions outlined have been considered against the following prioritization criteria:

1. Clear link to critical unmet need.
2. Strategic intervention with the potential to contribute to a wide range of objectives across the NRP.

\textsuperscript{51} Jordan Multi-sector Needs Assessment, November 2013.
\textsuperscript{52} Jordan Multi-sector Needs Assessment, November 2013.
\textsuperscript{53} Mercy Corps (2012), p. 7.
3. Demonstrable impact within short period of time (within three months to three years), be highly cost effective, achieving the best value possible for funds invested.

4. Reinforcing humanitarian activities to ensure that short-term measures in the housing sector are complemented by medium-term interventions (affordable housing programme) and longer term resilience (legal, institutional and policy reform in the housing sector).

5. Address clearly identified and measurable vulnerabilities among the poorest and most severely affected groups by the hosting effort.

6. National stakeholders from the construction sector, banking sector and government indicate that support for the response is a top priority.

Three interventions are included in the NRP: (i) specific programme targeting the adaptation of existing housing stock to increase the supply of affordable housing (described in 2014 Jordan RRP6) (ii) affordable housing programme; (iii) institutional, policy and legal reform in the housing sector. These are detailed in section 3.4 below.

**PROJECT SUMMARIES**

The project summary table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the project summary sheets included in Annex 1.

**Table 7: Housing Sector Project Summaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 1: Vulnerable Jordanian households have increased access to affordable and adequate housing.</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>2,277,000</td>
<td>1,379,000</td>
<td>4,506,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 1.1: Affordable housing for social cohesion and local economic development (Jordan Affordable Housing Programme)</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>2,277,000</td>
<td>1,379,000</td>
<td>4,506,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 2: Housing-related institutions, regulations and policies enable housing markets to meet the needs of all Jordanians, including vulnerable groups.</td>
<td>192,000</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 2.1: Jordan Housing Sector Reform Programme</td>
<td>192,000</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,042,000</td>
<td>2,632,000</td>
<td>1,582,000</td>
<td>5,256,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5 LIVELIHOODS & EMPLOYMENT

SITUATION ANALYSIS
The assessment conducted by the UN in November 2013 on the effects of the influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan indicates that vulnerable Jordanian households are the most impacted with regard to livelihoods and employability; particularly, in the four governorates of Amman, Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa. The employment and livelihood conditions for a significant proportion of Jordanians were already dire prior to the influx of Syrian refugees. High youth unemployment rates had become ‘structural’ and a drag on the economy. These factors coexist with the prevalence of low quality and low productivity jobs, which are occupied by non-Jordanian workers, pushing wages down. The percentage of working poor was already high, possibly due to a large informal economy, and the total number of poor households has been steadily increasing. The fragility of Jordan’s agricultural sector, which employs a significant number of Jordanians and which is heavily dependent on exchanges with Syria, has been exacerbated by an increased pressure over the natural – including pastoral - resources and productive base, while Syria’s has been exacerbated by drought. Furthermore, food prices have been affected by pre-existing government austerity measures implemented over the past two years to reduce subsidies on food and fuel. All of the above increases Jordanians’ vulnerability to shocks, but especially that of communities hosting large numbers of refugees.

The influx of Syrian refugees is undeniably affecting the labour market and livelihood opportunities in several ways. The impact on labour supply is especially high in the four main host governorates where Syrians are estimated to constitute around 8.4 percent of the total potential active labour force and as much as one-third of all the unemployed. Indeed, the unemployment rate in the four governorates increased from 12.2 to 12.4 percent between 2010 and 2012, while on a national level, the unemployment rate rose from 12.7 to 13.1 percent in the same period.

Evidence suggests that the main impact of the increasing number of the Syrian workers in the labour market has been to put significant downward pressure on wages, which has led to an enlarged informal economy. Several surveys and assessments indicate that male Syrian refugees are being employed in specific localities, with concentrations in informal agriculture, construction, food services and retail trade; suggesting that, to an extent, Syrian refugees have displaced Jordanian labour. This takes place predominantly in local and informal settings, where seasonal irregular work is found. It is also as a result of weak enforcement of laws, which gives employers the ability to hire informally and below the national minimum wage. This situation gives rise to labour exploitation and deteriorating working conditions, including an increase in child labour, which disproportionately impacts the most vulnerable. Given that more than half of the poor are working, and that about half of the total income of the poor is derived from wages, it can be safely stated that this downwards pressure on wages threatens to intensify the degree of poverty and vulnerability among Jordanians in host communities.
Vulnerable local communities are also experiencing reduced access to social safety nets. This is largely due to the increased competition between Syrian refugees and the poorest segments of host communities for informal charitable and relief services, and scarce natural resources. This is compounded by the sizable competition for low level employment or income generating opportunities, and accompanied by weak income support services such as employment and business development services, economic empowerment opportunities, and the capacity of local markets to create new jobs. These factors deepen the vulnerability of the local population rendering them unable to withstand the shocks brought about by the Syrian crisis.

Vulnerable women, whether looking for income earning opportunities or dependent on dwindling social support, are particularly impacted. Among Syrian women, there has been some limited development of home-based activities such as taking on sewing, cooking, baking and cleaning for Jordanian households, as well as running informal hair salons. While some of these activities may have augmented local services, rather than displacing existing Jordanian informal activities, there is some evidence that poorer Jordanian women—particularly those who head households—may face increasing competition in home-based production activities from Syrian women.

The negative impact of the crisis on the agricultural sector creates challenges for Jordanian livelihoods, especially in rural areas. There are increased unfettered movements of livestock and crops across borders from both Syria and Iraq into Jordan. This represents a major concern because Syrian livestock and crops have not been vaccinated or treated against trans-boundary animal and crop diseases for at least 24 months. This can lead to serious loses of productive assets for Jordanian farmers (men and women), further undermining their capacity to produce, which significantly reduces their income and places their food and nutritional security at risk. This problem is exacerbated by the insufficient resources of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) to control such threats. As a result the Jordanian agricultural sector, which already experiences low levels of productivity by global standards and has been struggling to cope with the challenges of climate change, is exposed to increased risk.

The serious decline in (formal and informal) trade between Jordan and Syria and the closure of important trade routes passing through Syria has resulted in a significant increase in the cost of production inputs. Jordanian smallholder farmers (men and women), of which there are many, are now unable to get their perishable horticultural produce to market, resulting in an overall fall in farm-gate prices. The direct impact is a reduction in the income of already vulnerable families of landless, marginal and small-scale farmers (men and women) from host communities, worsening their living conditions. The knock-on effects reduce their ability to purchase safe and nutritious foods products, which in turn impacts their diet, calorific intake and nutritional security.

Finally, the increasing risk of land degradation in the Badia rangelands of Mafraq Governorate further threatens people’s livelihoods. Because nomadic and transhumant herds
are not able to seasonally migrate to Syria, they stay in the Badia for longer periods and overgraze the fragile pastures. The limited water resources of the Badia are also at serious risk as a result of increasing demands from refugees and livestock populations.

**SECTOR OBJECTIVES**

**Overall Sector Objective:** The capacity of vulnerable households in host communities is strengthened to cope with and recover in a sustainable way from the impact of the Syrian crisis, and mitigate future effects on their employment and livelihoods.

**Specific Objective 1:** Create more and better job opportunities for the vulnerable (women and young men and women).

**Specific Objective 2:** Revive the local economies of the most-affected areas through support to existing and new micro and small enterprises for vulnerable households (women and young men and women).

**Specific Objective 3:** Restore and preserve pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources.

**Specific Objective 4:** Improve availability of and access to quality food for Jordanian host communities.

**RESPONSE PLAN**

**Prioritisation**

Under the resilience approach which guides the vision of the present plan, interventions are tailored to address both the impact of the crisis and the underlying vulnerabilities that exacerbate its effects. Thus, ideally, short, medium and long-term interventions should be mutually supportive and implemented simultaneously.

In line with the resilience vision, immediate attention is given to those interventions directed at supporting affected and vulnerable populations coping with the effects of the crisis in the short-term, through protecting people’s livelihoods and income-generation capacity, as a way to avoid further depletion of their assets. Informed by assessments carried out prior to this planning exercise, the following priorities are addressed:

1. Generating immediate job opportunities to absorb the high unemployment among the low skilled jobseekers in poor and vulnerable households simultaneously supporting local infrastructure, public works, and agricultural initiatives;

2. Address the serious threat posed by animal and crops trans-boundary diseases and pests affecting assets and productivity through supporting MOA in animal health & production challenges;

3. Immediate preservation of productive and income generation capacities to access food and basic services (food vouchers or direct distribution or cash for food, integrated homestead farming and emergency on-farm job creation), while also protecting the natural resource base on which livelihoods depend (through community-based water harvesting and range management practices).
The implementation of more detailed food security and livelihoods assessments is also regarded of the highest priority, to ensure proper targeting geared towards the poorest and most vulnerable, hence efficient and effective action on the ground. This will, in turn, better inform future planning and make available additional information for well-informed prioritization of actions.

Simultaneously, interventions supporting recovery should also receive adequate attention. Taking into account, inter alia, criteria related to the cost-effectiveness of the different response options in addressing the problems identified from different perspectives, priority should be given to: providing employment services that result in successful placement for young men and women and women through comprehensive active labour programs; micro-capital investments in micro and small business projects that empower the poor and create employment opportunities; strengthening national capacities for animal and crop diseases and pests surveillance and control; expansion of integrated homestead farming with added value created from community-based agro-processing and marketing; application and validation of good practices for the restoration of rangelands and water resources; systems for managing food supply and subsidies; demonstration of climate-smart technologies and practices for increased agricultural production and diversification.

The guiding principles of resilience suggest that all interventions be formulated with a continuum lens with a focus on longer-term action for building national and local capacity to scale up and sustain recovery efforts and development gains. At the same time there will be periodic monitoring of food security vulnerability and institutional support to agricultural and food security policies, e.g. regional TAD control, value chain development through public-private partnerships, national farmer field school programme for agricultural diversification and intensification and Badia rangeland improvement/enhanced livestock production.

**PROJECT SUMMARIES**

The project summary table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the project summary sheets included in Annex 1.

**Table 8: Livelihoods & Unemployment Project Summaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihoods &amp; Employment</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 1: Create more and better job opportunities for the vulnerable (women and young men and women).</td>
<td>23,650,000</td>
<td>25,150,000</td>
<td>21,200,000</td>
<td>70,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 1.1: Short-term job creation for the vulnerable households in host communities.</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>26,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 1.2: Active labor market program supporting permanent employment for job</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>38,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
seekers in host communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Summary 1.3: Improving labor market governance and the capacity of the Ministry of Labour</th>
<th>1,650,000</th>
<th>2,150,000</th>
<th>2,200,000</th>
<th>6,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 2: Revive the local economies of the most-affected areas through support to existing and new micro and small enterprises for vulnerable households (women and young men and women).</strong></td>
<td>9,650,000</td>
<td>13,650,000</td>
<td>13,700,000</td>
<td>37,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 2.1: Support micro, small and medium income generating Project Summaries for the vulnerable households (focusing on women &amp; young men and women)</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 2.2: Local Economic Development for the enhancement of livelihoods and employment opportunities for Jordanian host communities</td>
<td>2,650,000</td>
<td>3,650,000</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 2.3: Improve Rural Income Generation and Employment through Integrated Homestead Farming, Agro-processing and Marketing</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 3: Restore and preserve pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources.</strong></td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>4,250,000</td>
<td>4,350,000</td>
<td>10,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.1: Strengthen Control of Trans-boundary animal diseases (TADs) and improve animal health services</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2,950,000</td>
<td>3,050,000</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.2: Strengthen community based Natural Resource Management in the Badia rangelands of Jordan</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 4: Improve availability of and access to quality food for Jordanian host communities.</strong></td>
<td>8,177,500</td>
<td>6,725,000</td>
<td>4,100,000</td>
<td>19,002,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 4.1: Diversification of smallholders agricultural &amp; food production through promotion of climate-smart technologies</td>
<td>6,650,000</td>
<td>5,250,000</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
<td>14,650,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.6 LOCAL GOVERNANCE & MUNICIPAL SERVICES

SITUATION ANALYSIS
Jordan’s sub-national governance system has struggled to cope with the challenges imposed by the Syrian crisis, which has exacerbated a range of systemic and capacity deficiencies that prevent governorates and municipalities (newly-elected Municipal Councils) from meeting the demands placed on its services. The pre-crisis challenges confronting governorates and municipalities were already great; however the crisis has ensured that service delivery and local development planning requirements have been far exceeded.

The crisis has brought to the fore deficiencies in the capacities of Jordanian municipalities. Prime among them include: limited attention to service delivery performance, standards and outcomes; out-dated equipment and logistical means to ensure delivery and maintenance of services and assets; insufficient capacities underpinned by a freeze on public recruitment and a patronage-based system of recruitment; limited attention to unplanned urban growth resulting in increased informal settlements; limited participation especially in local development planning; out-dated financial management practices and systems; de facto authority vested in the hands of the Mayor with limited checks-and-balances; and inadequate civic engagement. There has been a steady decline in approval ratings.

The financial situation in most municipalities exacerbates these problems further: many are faced with a crippling salary burden and unsustainable debt service; own revenue generation is limited and constrained by legislation and vested interests; the current transfer system for funds to municipalities is unpredictable, insufficiently transparent and does not clearly address equalization requirements; and, consequently, municipal authorities have little, if any, investment capacity to respond to the growing needs of the population (or indeed, the recent surge in populations brought on by the Syrian crisis in some areas). The above picture is by no means uniform, with large variations, dependent on the size and capacity of municipalities. To compound these challenges, there is an insufficient regulatory framework to guide municipalities in their administrative duties and insufficient clarity in role division between governorates and municipalities.

UNHCR figures indicate that 80 percent of Syrian refugees have settled in non-camp settings in urban and rural areas. Across Jordan’s 12 governorates, 129,000 (22.5 percent) are living
in Irbid, 187,000 (32.6 percent) in Mafraq, 143,000 (24.9 percent) in Amman, 50,000 (8.7 percent) in Zarqa and 65,000 (11.4 percent) are spread across the rest of the country. All municipalities in Irbid and Mafraq Governorates have witnessed an increase in population as a result of the crisis, while some have experienced an unsustainable population surge (Mafraq – 128 percent; Ramtha – 47 percent; Al Serhan – 45 percent). Consequently, initial assessments on the impact of the crisis have focused almost exclusively on municipalities in the two northern governorates of Irbid and Mafraq. More data is required in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the effect of the crisis on the overall local governance system, and on affected populations. However, it is evident that the sudden Syrian population influx has contributed to the following notable impacts:

- Heightened pressure on municipalities to deliver more and better municipal and social services, address housing deficiencies, induce local economic development, and support social cohesion of communities.
- Increased local tensions particularly from Jordanian citizens in host communities that are starting to demand a more effective response to their own needs from state institutions and local authorities, particularly in smaller communities.
- Temporary reprioritization of electoral and planned development programmes and investment frameworks in affected areas, with the longer-term potential to derail efforts to introduce and sustain a new system of horizontal sub-national planning.
- Critical decisions on the future shape of sub-national governance threaten to be delayed further as a consequence of the urgent need to respond to the pressing needs of host communities.

The number of Syrian refugees residing outside the refugee camps in Jordanian communities adds additional pressure to municipalities already struggling to provide essential services. Solid Waste Management (SWM) is a particular concern; the influx of refugees means in principle an increase of an estimated 340 tons of waste to dispose of daily. Prior to the crisis, SWM capacity was in many respects already exceeded, logistical means were out-dated and insufficient, financial means overwhelmed by increasing fuel cost, and technical and institutional processes inefficient – and environmentally not sustainable. There are other major resilience (sustainability) challenges related to the full optimization of provisions of the Law of Municipalities (i.e. the role of Joint Service Councils in the latter stages of the SWM cycle - handling, volume reduction and treatment and landfilling).

A number of other municipal services and planning functions are impacted directly by the crisis: (i) urban management capacity and development control (related to urban growth and new construction); (ii) lack of roads, storm water drainage and street lighting in new settlement expansion areas; (iii) road degradation as a result of heavy transport loads; (iv) overutilization of public spaces and parks as transit areas for refugees; (v) inadequate

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54 Calculated from population figures from end of 2012 (DOS) and refugee figures from 1/2/2014 (UNHCR)
capacity of municipal cemeteries; (vi) inadequate housing solutions; (vii) poor water and sanitation conditions as a result of inadequate infrastructure (provided by central government agencies); (viii) lack of prioritization of earlier LED gains/initiatives as urgent service delivery, humanitarian assistance, and social cohesion efforts take priority, etc.

Municipal services have been adversely affected by the Syrian crisis, and delivery performance is, in the most affected areas, for the most part, rapidly declining. Without a significant adjustment to the mechanisms for calculating, collecting, and utilizing own-revenues and transfers, the outlook with regard to municipal service delivery will remain bleak given the prospect of a sustained increase in the refugee population in affected areas. Jordanian host communities are witnessing declining service levels and social tension is rising.

A number of interventions have been, or are about to be, initiated that support municipalities to overcome some of the above challenges, albeit with varied geographic targeting. The EU have been piloting local economic development and municipal capacity building respectively through the Baladyati and PLEDJ programmes in five governorates (Zarqa, Mafraq, Karak, Ajloun, and Tafila), and will soon initiate a new programme supporting national policy dialogue on decentralisation. The EU undertook two missions in 2014 to assess and contribute to instilling the principles of environmentally sound management of solid waste into municipalities and Joint Services Councils while bringing about a significant improvement in their capacity to manage household solid wastes effectively. This aims to critically review the prevailing waste management practices and suggest recommendations for improvement, laying the groundwork for short, medium and longer term investment, taking into consideration the temporary nature of the crisis.

The USAID Jordan Local Enterprise Support activity (LENS) is a US$49.5 million, five-year project that will assist micro and small enterprises (MSEs) to grow their businesses and create job opportunities, while developing an inclusive enabling environment for economic development in selected municipalities.

The USAID Community Engagement Project (USAID CEP) is a three-year, US$21 million USD project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Global Communities (formerly CHF International), in collaboration with Jordanian partners Al Jidara and Jordan River Foundation. USAID CEP builds community cohesion and enhances the resilience of communities to more effectively address evolving challenges. It is a grassroots program that utilizes a participatory process to engage community members in addressing community needs and stressors within the context of regional volatility and transitions associated with domestic policy reform, economic conditions, and demographic changes. In addition to community members, USAID CEP works with Jordanian NGOs, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), local government, and the private sector.
The Regional and Local Development Programme (RLDP) is implemented by MOMA and the Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB) with funding from the World Bank and AFD (50.5 million dollar for five years, till the end of 2014). The project has been providing a wide range of support to municipalities across Jordan, including for the procurement of equipment and building capacity. Amongst its closing activities, it is expected to finance the development of a solid waste management strategy for Jordan and to procure SWM equipment at a cost of US$2 million. However, this equipment is not explicitly targeted at Northern municipalities. The World Bank is also implementing through MOMA and CVDB an Emergency Services and Social Resilience Program (ESSRP) with funding from the UK, Canada, and Switzerland through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (US$53 million dollar for three years, till the end of 2016). ESSRP is targeting nine municipalities (five in Irbid, and four in Mafraq), and is aimed at helping Jordanian municipalities and host communities address the immediate service delivery impacts of Syrian refugee inflows and strengthen municipal capacity to support local economic development.

Through the provision of direct grants, the project will help municipalities bring back their service delivery levels to pre-crisis levels through improvements in solid waste collection, waste water management, rehabilitation, street lighting, and bringing back an overall improvement in the quality of life. It will also support municipalities in revising their local development plans by taking into account the new challenges and paving the way for improved investments that could generate employment opportunities for the local communities. These interventions will help address the rising community tensions resulting from the present crisis, thereby bringing stability into the northern region and help improve the capacity of local institutions in managing similar future crises. Since ESSR will be dependent on the articulation of specific needs by concerned municipalities, the exact focus of investments towards SWM and different municipal services is still to be defined.

UNDP has initiated several phases of support to improve the system of property tax management and collection, and recently initiated the Host Communities Programme (HCP), with a focus on institutional coordination, municipal services, livelihoods, community participation, and social cohesion with initial seed funding of US$4 million from the Government of Japan. This will contribute to the provision of some of the needed compactors to the most affected municipalities in coordination with MOMA. An additional fund of US$1.75 million has been provided by the Government of Japan through HCP/UNDP to support rapid employment. UNDP approach builds on traditional elements of socio-economic reintegration interventions—putting people to work, injecting money into local economy, providing alternative employment opportunities and introduces innovative dimensions: promotes individual savings, enhances social cohesion through encouraging community members to organise to realise economic activities collectively (horizontal cohesion) and engage other actors (vertical cohesion) in joint economic ventures based on collective savings, outside investment, and risk sharing.

Through the HCP programme UNDP conducted a municipal needs assessment, to prioritise the municipal needs covering the 36 municipalities of Irbid and Mafraq, and a labour market
survey in eight governorates to study market needs of skills to design demand driven vocational training programmes for young Jordanians, especially in the areas most affected by the crisis. UNDP is providing technical assistance to the ESSRP, through strengthening the municipalities capacities in community outreach. The Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) has allocated US$2 million through HCP/UNDP to support employment generation and municipal services. This will contribute to the provision of some of the needed compactors to the most affected municipalities in coordination with MOMA.

The Government of Japan provided US$10 million to the GOJ to purchase equipment and machinery. On behalf of the German Government, GIZ will provide technical assistance through workshops equipped to train municipality staff on solid waste equipment maintenance. The Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DGCS) of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides support to municipalities affected by the Syrian refugee’s influx in Jordan, through a programme financed through a “Budget Support Component or Development Fund” for a total of 1.5 million EUR. A “Technical Assistance Fund”, directly managed by the Italian side for a total amount of EUR 250,000 will provide technical assistance to the Project.

The humanitarian response has primarily targeted Syrian populations living in the camps, and to a lesser extent in Jordanian communities, although some small-scale interventions have been provided towards municipal infrastructure and services. With regard to the overall local governance system, there have been a number of national and local interventions aimed at supporting local public sector service delivery and local development, but these remain insufficient to address growing municipal needs at the short term, and less sufficient at the medium term.

**Problem statement:** Municipalities do not have the requisite capacity (finances, human resources and expertise, and equipment) to meet key service delivery and local development priorities stemming from the Syrian crisis and the sub-national planning and execution machinery is out-of-sync with current development and crisis mitigation challenges.

**SECTOR OBJECTIVES**

**Overall sector objective:** The Jordanian local governance system is responsive to host citizens’ and communities’ needs identified in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis.

**Specific objective 1:** Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis.

**Specific objective 2:** Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.
Specific objective 3: *Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long-term as a result of better performance in core functions and more enabling legal and fiscal framework.*

The following indicators may be used to measure progress towards these objectives:

1. Crisis-affected populations benefiting from improved service delivery in 50 most affected Municipalities (27 in Irbid and Ma'faq Governorates and 23 in other governorates). (Baseline: No improvements in service delivery in 2013 in host communities).

2. Seventy percent of northern municipalities ensuring pre-crisis levels of service delivery in one or more areas: (i) solid waste; (ii) local roads; (iii) street cleaning; (iv) parks/recreational space; (v) community services (Baseline: 20 percent of northern municipalities maintain pre-crisis service delivery rate in SWM in 2013 - UNDP survey).

3. At least five service delivery chains benefiting from technical improvements, new partnership arrangements or other interventions which result in at least 25 percent cost-efficiency gains.

4. Seventy percent of northern municipalities with service delivery budget increase (2015 vs. 2013) by rate equivalent to at least half of their demographic growth rate (Baseline: 38 percent of northern municipalities with budgets increased in 2014 by more than half of their demographic growth rate - MOMA data 2013).

5. Thirty municipalities benefiting from direct financial support clearing annual technical audits without adverse opinion (Baseline: No municipalities benefiting from block grants or direct project support in 2013).

6. Seventy-five percent satisfaction rate with municipal service delivery among host communities (Baseline: 50 percent satisfaction rate with municipal services in survey conducted in July 2013 - Global Communications).

7. Twenty municipalities (municipalities in Ma'faq and Irbid Governorates and most affected municipalities in other governorates based on a clear criteria provided by MOMA) have 20 rapid city profiles addressing socio-economic needs developed in a gender responsive manner, including 80 community-level plans, to support coordinated implementation of humanitarian, government and development projects (Baseline: No municipalities with city profiles in 2013).

**RESPONSE PLAN**

**Response options**
As outlined in the situation analysis, Jordanian municipalities do not have the requisite capacity to respond to key service delivery and local development priorities stemming from the Syrian crisis. The sub-national planning and execution machinery is out-of-sync with current development and crisis mitigation challenges. These issues cannot only be resolved at the sub-national level given that there remain a number of unresolved challenges within the wider local governance system.

Specific objectives outlined for the local governance sector will help mitigate the effects of the Syrian crisis in host communities whilst also contributing to Jordan’s national development priorities. In this regard, they are designed with a resilience-based approach in mind:

**Coping**
- **Specific objective 1:** Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis.
- **Specific objective 2:** Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.

**Recovering**
- **Specific objective 1:** Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis.
- **Specific objective 2:** Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.

**Sustaining**
- **Specific objective 2:** Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.
- **Specific objective 3:** Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long-term as a result of better performance in core functions and more enabling legal and fiscal framework.

Within these objectives, six broad interventions are foreseen that will target host communities in the most affected municipalities of Jordan. Options exist to implement these interventions either as large or small programmes or projects. Most of the interventions will target 27 municipalities in Mafraq and Irbid Governorates (this excludes municipalities targeted by the WB funds through the ESSR Programme). In case interventions specified in this document are not covered by the ESSR, support might be considered under certain interventions, based
on justification provided by MOMA. Interventions will also target the 23 most affected municipalities in other governorates based on a clear criteria provided by MOMA.

Interventions will target urgently required investment and capacity building in municipal services and infrastructure, with a particular focus on SWM. Many of the investments foreseen in this plan respond to needs that have been identified during the process of preparing Governorate Development Plans. Options exist to disburse funds through existing or new donor grant mechanisms in the immediate coping phase while, for the recovering phase, the GOJ has committed to a gradual increase in the transfers pool for municipalities during 2014 and 2015. Debt relief may be considered for municipalities facing the biggest service delivery gaps. In addition to these investments, interventions will also address immediate and longer-term capacity development requirements related to the different stages of the SWM cycle (handling, treatment and disposal), and other municipal service lines (road maintenance and development, street lighting, small/storm water and sewage maintenance works, parks and public space maintenance, slaughterhouse improvements and development), while significant efforts will be made to support concerned Joint Service Councils to fulfil their mandate as prescribed by the Municipalities Law.

In the immediate coping phase, rapid planning and coordination support will be provided to municipalities and communities in affected areas. Subsequent inputs targeting recovering will capitalize on, improve or initiate new community and city-level plans that are responsive to the needs of the population and the development challenges imposed by the Syrian refugee influx into municipalities. In the first year, three person teams will be deployed to the most heavily impacted municipalities. In Year two, three person teams will also be deployed for the other municipalities whereas the first most affected municipalities served in year 1, will receive mobile teams to sustain the work. In years two and three, support can reduce incrementally with greater emphasis on mobile teams to ensure capacity is built, not replaced. Technical assistance will also be provided to strengthen capacity and planning/implementation linkages in governorate and municipal Local Development Units (LDU), with a particular focus on proactive LDU roles in capturing local needs. With regard to sustaining local development, Local Economic Development (LED) plans will be supported using a value chain methodology, while wider efforts will be provided to ensure access to funding for identified sectors, pursue public-private-partnerships, as well as improving business licensing processes.

The third objective will focus on sustaining resilience through interventions that will support the creation of an enabling environment for local public sector performance improvement. Technical assistance will be provided to municipalities in affected areas that will target organisational development, financial management and fiscal autonomy. An assessment will also be made of the overall local governance system’s response to the refugee influx, mandates and inter-relations between different actors, human resource systems and capacities, service requirements/performance and local finance systems, including crisis preparedness. MOMA will receive support to define a set of municipal service standards, identify local governance capacity building needs, assess progress under the system of
Governorate Development Plans, as well as the implementation of new Urban Planning Management Strategy and Regulatory Framework in Mafraq Governorate.

The above interventions take account of various cross-cutting considerations including vulnerability, social cohesion, gender responsiveness and environmental sustainability. In addition, they are designed to facilitate the coordinated investment of resources – whether from government, humanitarian or development sources – in line with municipal plans and policies.

**Prioritisation**

Interventions outlined in this Sector Plan have been considered against the following prioritization criteria:

1. Clear link to sector objective and critical unmet need and/or gap in service provision that no agency is already undertaking or planning to undertake, complementing ongoing assessments and support provided by different donors and UN agencies, as well as the humanitarian activities.

2. Address clearly identified and measurable vulnerabilities among the poorest and most severely affected groups by the hosting effort.

3. National or local authorities indicate that support for the response is a top priority.

4. Demonstrable impact within short period of time (within three months to three years), highly cost effective, and achieving the best value possible for the funds invested.

5. Potential to contribute to interventions across all sectors of the NRP, and to correspond to a wider regional response to the crisis.

6. Potential to demonstrate decentralisation in practice and support longer-term institutional reforms.

The Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MOMA) will work on producing an overall needs matrix, where all needs, ongoing support, and support gaps are identified, to provide a clear picture of the real needs of this sector. The proposed interventions will be prioritized with a clear indication of i) where the needs are greatest taking into account the “gaps” and ii) what interventions fall under immediate/medium term and longer term. Example: targeting service delivery needs would be more of a priority than building the enabling environment for improved governance and institutional support to municipalities.

All included interventions have been identified by national and local authorities as top priorities. Prioritisations has also been made within different objectives and interventions based on these criteria. For example, while the option existed to develop a new landfill site with longer-term capacity potential, a resilience approach was applied which targets the alternative of upgrading and rehabilitating of nine landfill sites that can service large areas of
the north affected by the influx of Syrian refugees and, in so doing, contribute to meeting critical unmet gap in service provision, as well as addressing vulnerabilities among the poorest and most severely affected groups living in close proximity to existing landfills. Other interventions have been selected to ensure a demonstrable and cost-effective impact within a short period of time, such as the selection of direct donor funding mechanism to municipalities in the initial coping phase, followed by an increased share of central government transfers in the subsequent recovering phase.

The Local Governance Task Force co-chaired by MOMA reviewed the interventions for municipal services proposed in the RRP6, where similar interventions are presented for the improvement of service provision and purchase of equipment (Vehicles, maintenance and operating cost for machines, and the purchase SWM equipment). The task force reviewed the needed equipment in the RRP6 (US$56,123,000) which only accounts for 30 percent of the total needed support, submitted by municipalities. The task force confirmed that the proposed support within the NRP under objective 1 covers 50 municipalities in the most affected four governorates (13 municipalities in Irbid, 14 in Mafraq and 23 affected municipalities in other governorates) to complement the RPP6 without any duplication, and to provide different types of machinery needed (compactors, containers). Interventions under this section also do not cover construction machines (as in RPP6), and maintenance of the main roads connecting governorates and main cities. Furthermore, the RRP6 addressed the use of modern technology in waste disposal, while the NRP focused on nine landfills in the North addressing landfill mining, recycling units, collection and transfer units, composters, and digesters, which also complements the RRP6 and does not duplicate. The same logic applies to support under interventions related to local governance systems.

Following a very detailed, transparent, and participatory needs study and costing exercise, the task force was able to come up with the proposed total cost of US$205,853,800. This requested support, in addition to the RRP6 proposed support of US$103,123,000 would still be below the actual needs of the municipal services sector related to the Syrian crisis.

**PROJECT SUMMARIES**
The Project Summary Table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the Project Summary Sheets included in Annex 1.

**Table 9: Municipal Services Proposed Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipal Services</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 1: Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis.</td>
<td>70,744,000</td>
<td>61,744,000</td>
<td>47,019,000</td>
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<td>Project Summary 1.1: Improved service delivery in SWM based on participatory planning, equipment &amp; technological</td>
<td>44,444,000</td>
<td>40,494,000</td>
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Project Summary 1.2: Improved non-SWM services in the most affected municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>26,300,000</th>
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<th>61,400,000</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**Specific Objective 2: Local development priorities, project summaries and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4,649,157</th>
<th>5,607,888</th>
<th>4,245,721</th>
<th>14,502,766</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Project Summary 2.1: Rapid planning and coordination support to municipalities, governorates and communities

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2,894,457</th>
<th>2,205,388</th>
<th>2,225,921</th>
<th>7,325,766</th>
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</table>

Project Summary 2.2: Local development planning (including economic aspects) aligned with new context and is gender sensitive

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1,754,700</th>
<th>3,402,500</th>
<th>2,019,800</th>
<th>7,177,000</th>
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**Specific Objective 3: Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long term as a result of better performance in core functions and more enabling legal and fiscal framework.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3,719,000</th>
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Project Summary 3.1: Targeted support to organisational development, financial management and fiscal capacities of municipalities

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</table>

Project Summary 3.2: Creating enabling environment for local public sector service delivery

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>1,000,000</th>
<th>3,485,000</th>
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**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>79,112,157</th>
<th>72,761,888</th>
<th>53,979,721</th>
<th>205,853,766</th>
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</table>
2.7 SOCIAL PROTECTION

SITUATION ANALYSIS

The Syrian crisis has put pressure on the coping mechanisms for the most vulnerable groups, i.e. poor households, female headed households, survivors of violence; children deprived of parental care; children in conflict with the law; child labour and persons with disabilities, as well as social services available to support these groups. There have been three main impacts in terms of protection services, social protection, and social cohesion. Firstly, national and local protection services, which were previously under-resourced, have been put under further immense strain; secondly, social protection mechanisms have also been put under strain by an increasing caseload; and thirdly, social tensions have led to an atmosphere of increased violence and unrest in host communities.

There has been an increased caseload for Jordanian protection services due to the Syrian crisis. The majority of Syrian refugees are constituted of vulnerable groups, including women, children and youth. Refugees have quite urgent needs, as they have already eroded their coping mechanisms (limiting their ability to survive without assistance) and are thus in more desperate conditions when they reach Jordan. The Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) estimates an extra JOD8 million in 2013 being spent because of the crisis, out of a total budget of JOD110 million.55 The Family Protection Department (FPD), which addresses violence, reported a ratio of one social worker for 400 cases illustrating the low level of human resources available. Syrian cases represented 7 percent of the caseload of the FPD so far in 2013, demanding a range of resources, including placing Syrian women and children in protective shelters. There is also a general lack of mental health and psychosocial services available to families that are referred to FPD. Juvenile services have also been demanding extra resources from already stretched social workers and the juvenile system.

The economic strain related to the crisis is increasing the numbers of children engaged in child labour for both Jordanian and Syrian children. The MOSD expects an increase in the number of Syrian children requiring care either through fostering or institutional care increasing the case load on MOSD overtaxed resources. and at the same time, resources for other vulnerable groups such as the elderly and disabled are already stretched and will be impacted by the increased caseload.

Social protection mechanisms such as cash assistance and social security were not planned for the Syrian influx. The National Aid Fund (NAF) which targets the poorest families in Jordan estimates the indirect and direct impact of the Syrian crisis have resulted in an extra 20,000 Jordanian families in their assistance programmes (cash for work, micro-finance, cash assistance) which results in an extra JOD3 million required for their budget annually. Children are insufficiently targeted, with only 28 percent of NAF beneficiaries being

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children, despite the fact that 57 percent of the poor are children. The working poor also miss out on this cash assistance and make-up 55.2 percent of the working-age population living underneath the poverty line. The working poor are often in competition with Syrians in the informal labour market where wage pressure and competition for jobs is impacting the opportunities available for women and youth, both of which had very high pre-crisis unemployment rates. A need has emerged to evaluate the NAF to improve targeting and ensure sustainability of supported families, reducing their dependency on the fund for sustenance. The increase in unemployment is impacting the social security system and continued initiatives in Social Protection could better address these impacts on the most vulnerable.

Community-based mechanisms are also weaker than before, with social tensions and the diversion of resources lowering their capacities. With no visible end to the Syrian humanitarian crisis, as time goes by, the dynamics of the host community has been altered with observed levels of tension, accentuated by increased economic pressures and decreased access to public services, leading to increased levels of insecurity, fear, and risk of violence between the communities and within households. Jordanians sense that their living situation has deteriorated. The crisis has also accentuated the perceived lack of sufficient participatory governance at the local and national level with host communities feeling that their needs are not taken enough into account by their institutions and/or that their capacity to solve pressing issues is too limited.

The influx has affected both the Syrians and Jordanians in host communities, particularly the groups who were already vulnerable in pre-crisis Jordan. Over-crowding in the school system due to the crisis has exacerbated violence levels in schools, crippling MOEd capacity to address this problem. In response to these needs, the humanitarian community is providing safe spaces for children, women and youth (young boys and girls) in host communities and some protection services are available. Through partnerships between GOJ, UN agencies and CSOs, community centres are being strengthened to offer a multi-sectoral response to children and women survivors of violence and those at risk. However, these interventions do not have the scope to address pre-existing institutional gaps in services for the most vulnerable Jordanians to ensure a more resilient community.

The efforts through the NRP Protection sector objectives will complement the humanitarian efforts through RRP6 that emphasise social cohesion and strengthening community based protection especially against SGBV and child protection as its significant protection components. These objectives recognise the large scale of socio-economic impact of the Syrian crisis on the host community and the support needed by the host country and international aid actors.

56 UNICEF 2011, Social Protection Review
57 National Poverty Reduction Strategy, UNDP, 2013
Objectives will be reached through strengthening existing networks of service providers and planners capable of ensuring the delivery of timely responses and proper case management to ensure the protection of women and children’s rights. Thus, the key relevant ministries are Ministries of Education, Social Development, Justice, Interior, Health, and Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, Public Security Directorate/Family Protection Department & Juvenile Police, Department of Statistics and Chief of Islamic Justice, National Aid Fund, Zakat Fund, National Council for Family Affairs, Judiciary Council, and the Jordanian National Commission for Women, National Centre for Human Rights. This will be done in collaboration with NGOs such as JRF, ICCS, Family Guidance and Awareness Centre, Family Protection Society and from the UN side: UNICEF, UNFPA, UN WOMEN and ILO. In addition, cooperation will be strengthened with the academic and research centres such as Hashemite and Jordan Universities as well as the Columbia University for Social Work (CUMERC).

SECTOR OBJECTIVES

Overall Sector Objective: Vulnerable groups affected by the crisis have access to improved social protection and improved legal and operational protection frameworks and services in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis

Specific objective 1: Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups in the governorates most affected by the crisis.

Specific objective 2: Improve social protection and poverty alleviation mechanisms for vulnerable people affected by the crisis.

Specific objective 3: Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between GOJ & community based mechanisms.

The following indicators may be used to measure progress towards these objectives:
1. Number of survivors of violence receiving improved protection services (Baseline: TBD, target: 30,000 survivors of violence, exploitation and neglect and child labour).
2. Number of institutions with improved capacities to deliver protection services. (Baseline: Nine FPD, one shelter, one JPD, 10 Health Committees (HC). Target: 11 FPD, three Shelter, 11 JPD, 70 HC)
3. Communities have improved knowledge to prevent and address all kinds of violence (Baseline: TBD, 10 percent of population).
4. Number of schools implementing plans to reduce violence (baseline: 50 percent, target 80 percent of schools)
5. Diversion and foster care programmes implemented (baseline: programmes implemented in three governorates; target: programmes implemented in six governorates)
6. Family Violence Tracking System operational (baseline: operational in Amman; target: operational in four governorates)
7. Communities have improved knowledge on establishing and implementing self-reliance projects (baseline: none, target: four governorates)
8. Number of poor people benefitting from improved social protection services including cash assistance and housing (Baseline: 7 percent of poor population, target: 10 percent of poor population).
9. Number of poor NAF beneficiaries having access to credit facilities (baseline: none, target: 3,000 HH)
10. Number of disabled persons benefitting from community based rehabilitation services (Baseline: TBD, Target: 60,000 disabled persons).
11. Number of stakeholders (Gov’t, NGOs, CBOs) trained on approaches to mitigate violence through establishing an early warning and response mechanisms (Baseline: none, target: ten institutions).

RESPONSE PLAN

Prioritisation
Response prioritization criteria have been considered by each intervention, with a particular focus on vulnerability as this section will target those most vulnerable in society who are most implicated by the crisis.

Prioritization Criteria
1. Clear link to sector objective and critical unmet need and/or gap in service provision that no agency is already undertaking or planning to undertake, complementing humanitarian activities.
2. Demonstrable impact within a short period of time (within three months to three years), be highly cost effective, achieving the best value possible for funds invested.
3. Support from the national authority (MOSD) has been indicated for every intervention proposed.
4. The representation of civil organisations, the GOJ and the UN has been wide and participatory, ensuring institutional arrangement long-term to implement interventions.
5. Objectives are firmly linked to the National Agenda and complement efforts within the RRP.
6. Interventions improve the long-term resilience of the GOJ to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups.

Extended criteria-Vulnerable groups
Vulnerability is a particularly important criterion for each intervention as this section targets the most vulnerable groups. Below are criteria for the sector as a whole which each intervention has considered in its design and targeting. Details on particular targeting, including the level of targeting according to vulnerability are identified in more detail in the intervention sheets.
1. **Areas of highest refugee concentration:** Governorates and districts with the highest numbers of refugees, namely Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa, Jerash, Balqa and Amman. These populations have been most affected by the crisis and require resilience-building mechanisms to address the consequences of the crisis.

2. **Poverty:** Areas and households (across Jordan) with the highest rates of poverty will be particularly targeted using the indicator for those below and close to the poverty line (2012 Household Income and Expenditure Survey HIES) and the Jordan Population and Family Health Survey JPFHS 2012 indicator on wealth and the Ministry of Planning and Department of Statistics Quality of Life Index (QLI). This indicator will be used on the levels suitable to the intervention (governorate, district, and household) and according to the available information. These areas and households are impacted directly and indirectly by the crisis and require support to cope with this impact.

3. Groups with **reduced access to material resources & services** (i.e. people with disabilities, poor households, households displaced due to economic pressures).

4. Groups that have **low levels of participation** (i.e. women, girls, youth, children, people with disabilities).

The inter-linkages between these factors will be encouraged in identifying those most in need in the identified population. Given that vulnerability is experienced at a localized level, contextual analysis of vulnerability, based on participatory assessments will be implemented to target the most vulnerable and address existing social and cultural practices that may marginalize certain groups in specific locations.

**PROJECT SUMMARIES**

The Project Summary Table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the Project Summary Sheets included in Annex 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 1: Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups.</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Summary 1.1: National Protection System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Summary 1.2: Children and Women's Shelter</td>
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<td>15,090,000</td>
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<td>Project Summary 1.3: Addressing child labour in the vulnerable host communities in Jordan</td>
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<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
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<td>Project Summary 1.4: Enhance the capacity of security forces to respond to protection concerns in gender sensitive, child friendly manner</td>
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<td>623,000</td>
<td>1,756,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Project Summary 1.5: Strengthening community resilience through offering multi-sectoral protection services in vulnerable host communities</td>
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<td>Project Summary 1.7: Expand and Enhance the National Protection management information system</td>
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</tr>
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<td>100,992,711</td>
<td>100,892,711</td>
<td>302,978,133</td>
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<td>Project Summary 2.3: Housing for poor families</td>
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<td>Project Summary 2.4: Disability Rehabilitation Centers</td>
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<td>Specific Objective 3: Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between Government of Jordan and Community based mechanisms</td>
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<td>Project Summary 3.1: Social Cohesion</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>113,933,211</strong></td>
<td><strong>341,861,133</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2.8 WATER & SANITATION

SITUATION ANALYSIS

Jordan is the fourth most water country in the world. Even a modest increase in population has a dramatic effect on the supply of water. The increase in demand from the burgeoning Syrian refugee population has impacted the amount and frequency of water available for Jordanians. Almost all Jordanians can access drinking water, but the quantity supplied per capita has recently decreased in some cases even to 30 l/p/d while the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) standard is 100 l/p/d. This decrease in quantity is also manifest through more stringent imposition of rationing. For example, the frequency of water supplied to consumers has reduced from once per week to once per month in some of the northern governorates where over half of the Syrian refugees are located, including also the Zaatari camp with a population exceeding 100,000 refugees.

This increase in population growth has reduced the amount of water available per person. Furthermore, ground water in certain areas is depleting at a rate of 1-1.2 meters per year. The general state of the network of water pipes is outdated, under-sized, and in serious need of rehabilitation, reinforcement, repair, and maintenance. Forty to fifty percent of water produced is non-revenue water (NRW) lost through network breakdowns, leakages and through illegal consumption and even higher rates of loss occur in parts of the northern governorates. Not least, there are increased competing pressures for water from agriculture and industry. In addition to a dilapidated billing system, Jordanians perceive that the water authority is not providing an adequate amount of water to justify the water fees. This is a somewhat distorted view, as one meter cubed of water costs approximately JOD2 (extraction, treatment/disinfection, operation & maintenance), but due to the heavily subsidized water tariff, customers pay on average less than JOD0.5 per cubic meter (25 percent of the cost). Thus the water authority is subsidizing water at approximately JOD1.5 per cubic meter for both their own customers as well as the Syrian refugee population.

There are also concerns regarding the potential pollution of the aquifer due to increased quantities of unregulated wastewater discharge. A number of Jordanians and Syrian refugees have also begun resorting to buying drinking water from private vendors due to the actual or perceived water quantity/quality issue, which is priced between 3 to 4 higher than the official water tariff.

Wastewater disposal increases pressure, both on sewerage systems and wastewater facilities in the northern governorates. According to the Yarmouk Water Company (YWC), only 43 percent of Jordanians are connected to a sewage network system in the north. More septic tanks and cesspits are likely to be in use and at higher frequencies due to the influx of Syrian refugees, with multiple families often living in a single residence. The main risk is the unsafe

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58 Ministry of Water & Irrigation cost of hosting Syrian refugees on water sector of Jordan.
disposal of excreta, as the high cost of emptying septic tanks by trucks is prompting house owners to dispose of the effluent illegally. Also wastewater treatment plants are receiving increased sewage loads and some of the plants are already working at their maximum capacity both hydraulically and biologically, and most are in the need of expansion and rehabilitation according to the WAJ. Schools are accommodating additional students as a consequence of the crisis, causing increased pressure on their water and sanitation systems. Approximately 68 percent of schools have septic tanks which are in poor condition or are not available. Sixteen percent of schools do not have internal sewerage networks or they are in such bad condition they require upgrading in order to be able to cope.

Water sector governance is led by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) and the WAJ. At the local level the WAJ and other state-owned companies such as the YMC, Aqaba and Miyahuna are providing services. YWC manages water supply and sewage systems in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Jerash and Ajloun. The other governorates are managed by WAJ local branches with the exception of Amman and Aqaba, where water and sewage systems are managed by Miyahuna and Aqaba Water Company (AWC) respectively. Besides the government agencies there are a number of donor agencies and governments involved in supporting the water & sanitation sector in Jordan, and all of them channelling their assistance through MWI and WAJ. More recently UN agencies and in particular UNICEF along with some international NGOs are playing more prominent roles in the water sector. Within the Water and Sanitation Task Force, UNICEF is the focal point for the UN agencies while the German Embassy is the donor focal point and Mercy Corps represents the NGO sector. However, the support of UN agencies and NGOs is still modest and does not meet the overall needs of the water and sanitation sector.

In 2013 the humanitarian community provided water and sanitation services mainly to refugees, but also responded to some water and sanitation needs in Ramtha (Irbid Governorate) and Mafraq in host communities.

In the 2014 RRP6, UN agencies and INGOs budgeted US$153,793,612 for WASH, primarily in response to the immediate relief needs of in-camp refugees. However, it also increased its focus on the needs of Jordanians in host communities directly impacted by the Syrian crisis through improved water and sanitation as well as hygiene promotion, mainly in the northern governorates. Likewise, RRP6 aims to improve hygiene promotion and access to WASH facilities in Jordanian schools, some of which now have double or triple the number of students accessing existing facilities.

The NRP envisions expanding the existing water and sanitation infrastructure to better serve both the Jordanian and Syrian refugee populations in host communities. Existing gaps in the current water network and larger infrastructure include: the development of additional water resources; restructuring, reinforcement and rehabilitation of water supply infrastructure; extension of sewer systems in towns; and the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP). The water and sanitation sector of the NRP therefore targets those systems which enable critical aspects of the system under most
pressure to cope and recover, supported by longer term measures that seek to build greater sustainability.

**SECTOR OBJECTIVES**

Jordan's ‘Water for Life: Jordan’s Water Strategy 2012-2022’ builds on the vision that, by 2022, Jordan will have: an adequate, safe and secure drinking water supply; greater understanding and more effective management of groundwater and surface water; healthy aquatic ecosystems; sustainable use of water resources; fair, affordable and cost-reflective water charges in place; measures implemented mitigating effects of increased population growth and economic development across all sectors which impact the water resources and their users; prepared and adapted to challenges triggered by climate change; efficient uses of water and reuse of treated water in irrigation are optimized.

The water sector has never been able to move onto a more predictable and sustainable level of service, it has remained in a permanent state of crisis. The latest influx of Syrian refugees in such large numbers, with limited financial and personnel resources, has added a significant additional burden that necessitates a fresh injection of financing to address. Without new levels of investment in the sector, the further decline in service levels can be fairly guaranteed.

**Overall Sector Objective:** To enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and in particular the Host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water & Sanitation service.

This would be achieved through the following specific objectives:

**Specific Objective 1:** Improving the quantity, quality and efficiency of safe drinking water delivery.

**Specific Objective 2:** Expanding and improving sanitation services.

**Specific Objective 3:** Addressing cross cutting water and sanitation issues.

**RESPONSE PLAN**

**Response options**

The following response options have been considered to address the impact of the Syrian crisis on water and sanitation in Jordan, but require in parallel additional provision of adequate implementing capacity to carry out donor-funded programmes and to adequately maintain existing and future infrastructure, in particular within the WAJ and YWC.
WATER

Water conservation

Non-revenue water (NRW), meaning water losses, stands at an alarming 50 percent. That is - water leakage, illegal consumption (50 percent of NRW), and limited financial resources to reinvest in operations and maintenance due to low tariffs and low revenue collection. This situation warrants urgent attention and specific projects are included below to stem the major losses from the system in the northern governorates and to improve the efficiency of the water network. These include projects on leakage control; rehabilitation of worn-out distribution networks; network restructuring/reinforcement to reduce excessive pressure and energy consumption due to pumping into undersized networks; containment of illegal extraction; and rationing of water and provision for rainwater collection tanks at the community levels. These are practical and feasible measures that can be swiftly introduced, subject to attracting financing.

Water quantity and quality

To augment the above, a small number of specific initiatives have been selected below that would immediately increase water quantity and improve water quality in the areas where supplies are most stretched. Such projects, already in the planning stage for covering the future needs from 2020 onwards, due to the Syrian refugee impact have to be implemented now. Special emphasis has been placed on the protection of ground water resources from over extraction from illegal wells, assessing safe aquifer extraction levels, and pollution prevention measures through implementation of watershed management, enforcement of protection zones around water resources and enhanced laboratory services. This will safeguard precious supply where they exist and prevent their premature depletion or pollution.

SANITATION

Sanitation coverage

While the longer-term aim is to significantly expand coverage of sewerage networks in the areas most affected by the crisis, the short-term intervention that gains precedence within the context of the crisis is to investigate more closely household excreta disposal options in those areas not covered by networks. It entails a three-fold approach: (i) the utilization of properly constructed and installed septic tanks according to the existing building code, including required assessment to identify the size and the nature of the problem; (ii) making
community/municipal connection systems available where connection to a wastewater treatment plant is possible within a short period of time; (iii) expansion of existing or the construction of new collector and wastewater treatment plants where demands are at their greatest.

**Water Reuse**

As a substitute for fresh water irrigation, treated wastewater can have an important role to play in water resources management. As a result, projects for wastewater reuse options are being implemented and others have been proposed where it is felt they can have a positive impact on the crisis. These priorities take account the environmental implications of both untreated wastewater discharges and treated wastewater reuse on the ground water and public health. They also promote greater use of suitable wastewater as an alternative source of agricultural irrigation, community livelihoods and income generation. Further, the general lack of enforcement on the discharge of untreated wastewater and weak control of harmful discharges to the environment and into existing bodies of water is affecting the demand and supply balance both for governorates and refugee camps. Measures will be taken within the scope of the NRP to tighten up on enforcement where regulations are being conspicuously breached.

**Increasing efficiency and implementation capacity**

As well as increasing the efficiency of the collection of wastewater, there is also a need to work on the efficiency of the wastewater treatment system. Wastewater treatment plants are not working optimally. In the refugee/host community areas most are either operating over design capacity - peak loads - or are in need of rehabilitation or upgrading in order to properly service the sanitary-household connection systems. On the capacity aspects, a number of treatment plants are currently receiving increased quantities (hydraulic) due to the dramatically increased populations inhabiting those areas. In parallel, increased biological loads (concentrations) are due to the increased number of sewage tanks, or intensity of their use in over-crowded households. Whilst the majority of wastewater treatment plants need rehabilitation according to WAJ’s annual report on the status of wastewater treatment plants, a number of those in the northern governorates have been prioritised within the NRP to help reduce pressure on the system in the highly impacted areas. Past experience has also shown improved wastewater treatment service delivery, as well as operation and maintenance when the private sector is engaged (i.e. public private partnerships, micro private sector participation) can be highly productive. Operating models involving the private sector will take equitable financial treatment of low-income communities into consideration and will form an integral part of the solutions set out below for the sector. It is also worth noting that during RRP implementation NGOs demonstrated good implementing capacity in WASH projects involving assessment, drawing plans, contracting, monitoring, etc.

**CROSS CUTTING WASH ISSUES**

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**Water and Sanitation in public institutions and places**

Water and sanitation in public institutions, especially schools, represents an important component of the overall programme - although it is viewed as a ‘political orphan’. Specific projects have been set out below, in particular where both Jordanian hosting communities and Syrian refugee families are attending overcrowded and double shift schools in the most-affected areas. This will empower schools to act as hubs for hygiene education, promotion of behaviours change on issues related to water economy and protection, climate change, etc.

**Capacity development**

Capacity development of service providers is required to address issues such as using PSP models for performance improvement, efficient operation of water & wastewater systems using SCADA & GIS based management systems, preventive maintenance & repair services, wastewater reuse, environmental impacts of waste water, best practices etc. Expansion of decentralized low cost wastewater treatment options with respective operation and maintenance support would be encouraged, providing job opportunities for (semi-) skilled labour in surrounding communities. This is an important feature that would enable the longer-term sustainability of interventions at the local level.

**Community participation, gender mainstreaming and awareness raising**

NRP implementation offers the opportunity to enlist the support of communities in order to help ensure sustainable impact. NRP interventions will promote the participation of local Jordanian population and Syrian refugee community groups to work together, with a special focus on ensuring the promotion of opportunities for women as well as setting standards for gender equality and sensitivity. This would be through the introduction of governance aspects and engagement of community leaders to increase community buy-in and support of the water and sanitation efforts. Community participation can have a positive impact on different issues, such as making sure that households in host communities will conserve water, connect their cesspits for improved environmental protection and hygiene, that cesspools are designed properly so as not to contaminate underlying aquifers, or that tankers will dispose of septic waste at designated wastewater treatment plants. Women and the poor bear a disproportionate share of the burden from scarce or mismanaged water resources. This is due to women’s prime role as management of the household and the poor in communities who often find it more difficult to fulfill their basic needs, such as access to dependable clean and safe supplies water. Therefore, any community WASH activities at the community level will be conducted with a special consideration of gender-relevant implications, as well as involving poorer Jordanian.

**Addressing impacts of climate change to the water sector**
Jordan relies heavily on the use of fossil fuel to generate electricity, frequent electricity cuts in summer especially in the Zaatari/Aqeb area affect the well fields and WWTP operation. As WAJ is the main user of electricity in the area, the use of solar or wind power for generating electricity for water pumping would greatly assist in reducing CO2 emissions and increase reliability and efficiency of water and wastewater services in the area.

**PRIORITIZATION**

Under the resilience plan, response planning and interventions should all linked to serve and attribute to the main objective “To enhance the capacity of the GOJ and in particular the host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water & Sanitation services’.

Intervention priority criteria should include both quick impact on vulnerable and affected population areas in terms of having access to adequate amount of safe drinking water and improved sanitation services. Jordan’s main water source is underground water and it is an interlinked water supply system crossing governorate boundaries to nationwide depending on the location of the aquifer and water basins. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of kilometers of transmission pipes carrying water to all Jordan towns and villages. Recovery and development should not be dropped as it builds Jordan’s capacity and gradually drives the country out from the emergency context. This will reinforce country stability in water and sanitation resources. Cost effectiveness is another factor and though this intervention may have high capital cost it is more cost effective on energy and operation costs in the long run.

Prioritisation can be summarized as follows:
- Lack of access to safe drinking water
- Affordability of water for both Jordanian and Syrian populations
- Underground water pollution and transmission of water borne diseases due to lack or poor access to sanitation
- Vulnerability and number of population benefited from the intervention
- Sustainability
- Cost effectiveness and low operation and maintenance
- Health risks and environmental friendliness

**PROJECT SUMMARIES**

The Project Summary Table below is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the Project Summary Sheets included in Annex 1.

**Table 11: Water and Sanitation Sector Project Summaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water and Sanitation</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
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<td><strong>Project Summary 2.1:</strong> Rehabilitation of wells indifferent governorate (Irbid, Jarash, Ajloun, Mafraq, Amman, Zarqa, Madaba, Balqa)</td>
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<td><strong>Project Summary 2.2:</strong> restructuring YWC main transmission/distribution systems &amp; network reinforcement(Irbid, Jarash, Ajloun, Mafraq, balqa)</td>
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